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Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole
Practices, and the Eighth Amendment
SARAH FRENCH RUSSELL

*

State parole boards have historically operated free from constitutional constraints
when making decisions about whether to release prisoners. Recent Supreme Court
decisions subject states to a new constitutional requirement to provide a “meaningful
opportunity to obtain release” for at least some categories of juvenile offenders.
Using original data collected through a survey, this Article provides the first
comprehensive description of existing parole board release procedures nationwide
and explores whether these practices comply with the Court’s Eighth Amendment
mandate.
The Court’s recent decisions in Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama prohibit
sentences of life without the possibility of release (LWOP) for juvenile offenders in
nonhomicide cases and forbid mandatory LWOP sentences in homicide cases. States
must now provide nonhomicide juvenile offenders with a “meaningful opportunity to
obtain release” and give judges the option of imposing a sentence with the chance of
release on homicide offenders. Around the country, state courts, legislatures, and
governors have started to respond to Graham and Miller. Yet there is little
scholarship focusing on a central issue raised by these cases: What constitutes a
meaningful opportunity to obtain release under the Eighth Amendment? The Court
has declined to provide detailed guidance on the matter, stating that “[i]t is for the
State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.”
Viewed in the context of the Court’s earlier Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the
meaningful opportunity for release requirement appears to encompass three distinct
components: (1) a chance of release at a meaningful point in time, (2) a realistic
likelihood of release for the rehabilitated, and (3) a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. For the most part, states have responded to Graham and Miller by making
juvenile offenders eligible for release under existing and long-standing parole board
procedures. To date, the debate in the states has focused primarily on the first
component of the meaningful opportunity requirement—when a juvenile offender
should be eligible for release. Most states have paid little attention to whether
existing parole board practices satisfy the other two components of the meaningful
opportunity requirement. These practices, which were designed for a different
purpose, may not offer a realistic chance of release and meaningful hearings for
juvenile offenders.
Parole procedures in every state are different, and many parole boards operate
under unwritten and unpublished rules. To understand existing practices, I sent a
survey to every parole board in the country. The survey results revealed procedures
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that, while adequate for adult offenders, may not survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny
when applied to juvenile offenders under Graham and Miller. Such procedures
include (1) preventing prisoners from appearing before decision makers, (2) denying
prisoners the right to see and rebut evidence, and (3) limiting the role of counsel. I
conclude that some states may not be able to rely on their existing parole board
practices to provide a meaningful opportunity for release, and may need to craft
special rules for considering release of juvenile offenders serving lengthy sentences.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida1 that imposing a
sentence of life without the possibility of release (LWOP) on juvenile offenders in
nonhomicide cases violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. In such cases, states must now provide incarcerated juvenile offenders
with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation.”2 Two years later, Miller v. Alabama3 held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits a sentencing scheme that mandates LWOP for juvenile
offenders—regardless of the severity of the crime. Instead, juvenile homicide
offenders facing possible life sentences are entitled to “individualized sentencing,”
and judges must have the option of imposing a sentence that allows a meaningful
possibility of release.4 Indeed, the Court emphasized that appropriate occasions for
sentencing juvenile homicide offenders to LWOP “will be uncommon.”5

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
Id. at 2030.
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
Id. at 2460, 2469.
Id. at 2469.
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Although Graham has received considerable scholarly attention,6 there is little
scholarship focusing on a central issue: What constitutes a “meaningful opportunity
to obtain release”?7 The Supreme Court has declined to provide detailed guidance
on this question, stating that “[i]t is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the
means and mechanisms for compliance.”8
In the wake of Graham and Miller, juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences
have challenged their sentences in court, and judges have started to craft remedies.9
In addition, state legislatures and governors are considering and adopting a range of
possible responses to the Supreme Court decisions.10 Viewed in the context of the
Court’s earlier Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it appears that Graham’s
requirement that states provide a meaningful opportunity for release encompasses
three distinct components: (1) individuals must have a chance of release at a
meaningful point in time, (2) rehabilitated prisoners must have a realistic likelihood

6. See, e.g., Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile Transfer
Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99 (2010); Mary Berkheiser, Death Is Not So Different After All:
Graham v. Florida and the Court’s “Kids Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence,
36 VT. L. REV. 1 (2011); William W. Berry III, More Different Than Life, Less Different
Than Death: The Argument for According Life Without Parole Its Own Category of
Heightened Review Under the Eighth Amendment After Graham v. Florida, 71 OHIO ST. L.J.
1109 (2010); Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012); Richard
S. Frase, Graham’s Good News—And Not, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 54 (2010); Kristin Henning,
Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due Process, Autonomy, and Paternalism
in Balance, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17 (2012); Dan Markel, May Minors Be Retributively
Punished After Panetti (and Graham)?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 62 (2010); Terry A. Maroney,
Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765 (2011);
Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 75 (2010);
Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “‘Death is Different’ No Longer”: Graham v. Florida and
the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV.
327; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In: The Supreme
Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth
Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79 (2010); Aaron Sussman,
The Paradox of Graham v. Florida and the Juvenile Justice System, 37 VT. L. REV. 381
(2012).
7. Several articles have addressed this issue to some degree but have a different focus
from the present Article. See Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should Do to Provide
a Meaningful Opportunity for Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and Potential,
24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 310 (2012); Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release
Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1 (2011). Glynn and Vila argue that state incarceration policies
currently impede the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. In addition, the authors argue that
states without parole systems must develop new release mechanisms, and they offer a model
statute for reducing sentences for juvenile offenders. Glynn & Vila, supra, at 333–46.
Green’s article argues that under Graham states must return to rehabilitative models of
incarceration of juvenile offenders, and adopt a prison release mechanism that assesses “the
individual juvenile life sentence offender’s success in attaining growth with a focus on the
psychology of human conduct.” Green, supra, at 34.
8. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.B–C.
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of being released, and (3) the parole board or other releasing authority must employ
procedures that allow an individual a meaningful opportunity to be heard.11 As
states respond to Graham and Miller, questions emerge about the scope of each of
these three components of the meaningful opportunity requirement.
First, a meaningful opportunity for release implies that the chance of release
must come at a meaningful point in time in the offender’s life. But when precisely
during the course of a prisoner’s incarceration must states provide this opportunity?
Is one chance at release enough, or must states provide periodic review of
sentences? Second, it is apparent under Graham that to be “meaningful,” the
chance of release for rehabilitated prisoners must be “realistic.” Yet Graham does
not say more about how likely states must make the possibility of release and
provides little guidance on the criteria that states should use in assessing whether to
grant release. Finally, to provide a meaningful opportunity for release, states must
give meaningful consideration to a prisoner’s suitability for release. But what
constitutes meaningful consideration? Do existing parole procedures fulfill this
mandate, or does Graham require parole boards to employ new procedures to
ensure that juvenile offenders have a meaningful opportunity to be heard? Do
procedural requirements for hearings stem from the Eighth Amendment, or does
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process analysis govern?12
Following Graham and Miller, most of the remedies created by courts and
considered and enacted by legislatures involve simply making juvenile offenders
eligible for parole under existing state parole practices.13 Courts and legislatures
have focused primarily on the timing of eligibility for release, but they have paid
relatively little attention to whether parole boards will offer a realistic chance of
release to these juvenile offenders and whether existing state parole procedures will
actually provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard.14
Many parole boards follow unwritten and unpublished rules on significant
matters, and information about the processes currently in place in the fifty states
has not been compiled elsewhere.15 To fill this void, I sent a survey to every parole
board in the country. Using the survey results, this Article presents the first
comprehensive description and analysis of parole release procedures nationwide. It
is apparent from an examination of these procedures that simply making a juvenile
offender eligible for parole may not ensure that the opportunity for release is truly
meaningful. Rather, important features are missing from existing parole release
processes in many states—features that are needed to ensure meaningful hearings
for juvenile offenders.16 For example, many state parole boards do not allow

11. See infra Part IV.
12. Few scholars have considered procedural aspects of the Graham decision. Notable
exceptions are Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring
Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 398 (2013), and Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality
and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745 (2012). These articles are discussed further infra notes
266–268 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II; see also Drinan, supra note 6, at 77–82 (offering suggestions for
state legislative responses prior to Miller).
15. See infra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part IV.C.
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prisoners to appear in person before the decision makers, deny prisoners the right to
see and rebut significant information relied upon by the board in rendering a
decision, and strictly limit the involvement of the prisoner’s attorney.17 If states are
going to rely on their parole boards to provide a meaningful opportunity for release
under the Eighth Amendment, many may need to craft special rules for boards to
use when considering release for juvenile offenders serving lengthy sentences.
In responding to Graham and Miller, states need to move beyond simply
considering when to make juvenile offenders eligible for release. They must also
consider how to provide meaningful hearings and a realistic chance of release for
rehabilitated offenders. Significantly, the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s
meaningful opportunity requirement is relevant not only in states that have imposed
LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders in nonhomicide cases (in violation of
Graham) and in states that mandate LWOP for certain offenses (in violation of
Miller). Rather, even states that impose sentences of life with the possibility of
parole on juvenile offenders must ensure that their parole processes in fact provide
prisoners with a meaningful opportunity for release. If the chance of release is not
meaningful under a state’s existing parole system, then a sentence of life with
parole is equivalent to an LWOP sentence for Eighth Amendment purposes. Thus,
all states around the country must take a close look at whether their parole systems
are operating consistently with new constitutional requirements.
Part I of the Article analyzes the Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham and
Miller and examines the relevance of release opportunities in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part II describes the responses by courts and state legislatures to
Graham and Miller, which for the most part have involved simply making juvenile
offenders eligible for parole under existing state parole systems. Part III presents
the results of a comprehensive survey of procedures currently used by parole
boards nationwide. Part IV considers the scope of Graham’s mandate to the states
and explores whether state responses are complying with Eighth Amendment
requirements. The Article concludes with suggestions for reforms to existing parole
practices in cases involving juvenile offenders serving lengthy sentences.
I. GRAHAM V. FLORIDA, MILLER V. ALABAMA, AND THE CHANCE OF RELEASE
A. The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Offenders
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has placed new limits on the types of
sentences that may be imposed on individuals who commit crimes under the age of
eighteen. In 2005, the Court held in Roper v. Simmons18 that the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits capital punishment
for juvenile offenders because of their lessened culpability.19 Five years later, in
Graham v. Florida, the Court held that it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose
a sentence of life without the possibility of release on some categories of juvenile

17. See infra Part IV.C.
18. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
19. Id. at 569–71.
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offenders.20 At least in nonhomicide cases, states must provide incarcerated
juvenile offenders with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”21
Relying on Roper, the Graham Court noted that “[a]s compared to adults,
juveniles have a ‘lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’;
they ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure’; and their characters are ‘not as well formed.’”22
Moreover, “[t]hese salient characteristics mean that ‘[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption.’”23
The idea that juveniles are capable of rehabilitation was central to the Court’s
analysis in Graham. The Court emphasized that “[j]uveniles are more capable of
change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of
‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of adults.”24 The Court
reasoned that a sentence of life without the possibility of release “forswears
altogether the rehabilitative ideal”25 and “deprives the convict of the most basic
liberties without giving hope of restoration.”26 “By denying the defendant the right
to reenter the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that
person’s value and place in society.”27 However, “[t]his judgment is not appropriate
in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change and limited moral
culpability.”28 The Court emphasized: “The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose
the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before
adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the
judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.”29
The Court thus held that a state “is not required to guarantee eventual freedom
to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime” but must “give
defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”30 The Court declined to provide
guidance on the details of this requirement, stating that “[i]t is for the State, in the
first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.”31 However,
the Court rejected executive clemency as a sufficient mechanism for compliance,
noting that this “remote possibility . . . does not mitigate the harshness of the
sentence.”32 The Court concluded that if a state “imposes a sentence of life it must

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
Id. at 2030.
Id. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (alteration in original)).
Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).
Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
Id. at 2030.
Id. at 2027.
Id. at 2030.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2027.
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provide [the prisoner] with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the
end of that term.”33
Justice Thomas, dissenting, argued that the Court’s decision invited “a host of
line-drawing problems to which courts must seek answers beyond the strictures of
the Constitution.”34 In particular, the dissent noted:
The Court holds that “[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual
freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime,” but
must provide the offender with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” But what,
exactly, does such a “meaningful” opportunity entail? When must it
occur? And what Eighth Amendment principles will govern review by
the parole boards the Court now demands that States empanel? The
Court provides no answers to these questions, which will no doubt
embroil the courts for years.35
Two years after Graham, the Court held in Miller v. Alabama that a sentencing
scheme that mandates a sentence of life without the possibility of release upon
conviction of an offense violates the Eighth Amendment when applied to
individuals who committed crimes when they were under the age of eighteen.36
Even in the most serious homicide cases, juvenile offenders are entitled to
“individualized sentencing” under the Eighth Amendment, and judges must have
discretion to impose a sentence that allows a meaningful opportunity for release
later in time.37
As in Graham, the Court in Miller emphasized the capacity of children to
rehabilitate. The Court reasoned that children have “greater prospects for reform”38
than adults and observed that mandatory LWOP “disregards the possibility of
rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.”39 Miller does not on
its face prevent a sentence of life without release for homicide offenders. However,
the Court noted that “given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision
about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we
think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible
penalty will be uncommon.”40 The Court stated that this is “especially so because
of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early
age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption.’”41 The Court concluded: “Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s
ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 2034.
Id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. (citation omitted).
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
Id. at 2460, 2469.
Id. at 2464.
Id. at 2468.
Id. at 2469.
Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
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how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”42
Thus, after Graham, a judge may not decide at the time of sentencing in a
nonhomicide case to imprison a child for life. Instead, if a life sentence is imposed,
it must be indeterminate: there must be a second look—and a “realistic” and
“meaningful” opportunity for the individual to be released based on demonstrated
rehabilitation.43 In addition, under Miller, in homicide cases, sentencing courts
must at least have the option of imposing a sentence that provides a meaningful
opportunity for release.44
Graham and Miller give little guidance to states about the scope of the
requirement that states provide “a meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” The
Court had not used this phrase previously in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and
the phrase did not appear in the briefing in Graham. Rather, it appears that the term
was first used during oral argument in Graham, when counsel for Graham asserted
that he was asking for states to provide “a meaningful opportunity to the adolescent
offender to demonstrate that he has in fact changed, reformed, and is now fit to live
in society.”45 As Justice Thomas anticipated in his Graham dissent,46 states are now
confronted with various questions about how to comply with the meaningful
opportunity requirement.
B. The Relationship Between the Eighth Amendment
and an Opportunity for Release
Although Graham and Miller provide little guidance about what a “meaningful
opportunity to obtain release” entails, clues regarding the significance of this
phrase appear in some of the Court’s earlier Eighth Amendment decisions.
Before Graham and Miller, the Supreme Court had not applied categorical bans
on sentences of imprisonment under the Eighth Amendment and thus had not made
the possibility of release a component of a categorical rule.47 Rather, the Court had
applied categorical bans on sentences only in capital cases.48 However, in
considering whether individual sentences for adult offenders withstood Eighth
Amendment proportionality scrutiny under the particular case circumstances, the
Court had previously noted that the possibility of release is relevant to the Eighth
Amendment analysis.
For example, in 1980, in Rummel v. Estelle,49 the Court found that the
availability of parole in the sentence under review weighed against finding an

42. Id.
43. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030, 2034 (2010).
44. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460, 2469.
45. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412).
46. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (noting that categorical restrictions were applied
previously only in death penalty cases); see Siegler & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 336–53
(discussing the evolution of the Court’s Eighth Amendment categorical analysis).
48. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(2002).
49. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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Eighth Amendment violation. In Rummel, the Court upheld a mandatory life
sentence imposed on a defendant under a recidivist statute after his third felony
conviction. 50 There, the Court emphasized that the prisoner was eligible for parole
after serving twelve years.51 The Court agreed with the prisoner that “his inability
to enforce any ‘right’ to parole precludes us from treating his life sentence as if it
were equivalent to a sentence of 12 years.”52 However, “because parole is ‘an
established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals,’ . . . a proper
assessment of Texas’ treatment of Rummel could hardly ignore the possibility that
he will not actually be imprisoned for the rest of his life.”53 The Court noted that
“[i]f nothing else, the possibility of parole, however slim, serves to distinguish
Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist statute like Mississippi’s,
which provides for a sentence of life without parole upon conviction of three
felonies including at least one violent felony.”54
In contrast, several years later in Solem v. Helm,55 the Court held that a sentence
of life without the possibility of release was unconstitutional under the specific
circumstances of the case: the offender’s sentence was imposed for a conviction of
uttering a “no account” check for $100, and his prior convictions were for
nonviolent and “relatively minor” offenses.56 In Solem, the Court emphasized that,
barring executive clemency, the prisoner “will spend the rest of his life in the state
penitentiary.”57 The Court reasoned: “This sentence is far more severe than the life
sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was likely to have been
eligible for parole within 12 years of his initial confinement, a fact on which the
Court relied heavily.”58
Although Rummel noted that “the possibility of parole, however slim, serve[d]
to distinguish Rummel” from those sentenced to life without the chance of parole,59
Solem makes clear that the actual likelihood of release is relevant to the Eighth
Amendment analysis. Although, in theory, the prisoner in Solem could have been
released by executive clemency, the Court concluded that this possibility did not
sufficiently mitigate the sentence given that clemency grants are unpredictable and
rarely granted.
The Court in Solem observed that the South Dakota commutation system
available to the prisoner was “fundamentally different from the parole system that
was before [the Court] in Rummel.”60 The Court noted that “[a]s a matter of law,
parole and commutation are different concepts, despite some surface similarities.”61
In particular, “[p]arole is a regular part of the rehabilitative process,” and

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 264–65.
Id. at 280–81.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 280–81 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972)).
Id. at 281.
463 U.S. 277 (1983).
Id. at 279–84.
Id. at 297.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 300.
Id.
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“[a]ssuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of
cases.”62 Moreover, because “[t]he law generally specifies when a prisoner will be
eligible to be considered for parole, and details the standards and procedures
applicable at that time[,] . . . it is possible to predict, at least to some extent, when
parole might be granted.”63 In contrast, commutation “is an ad hoc exercise of
executive clemency[, and a] Governor may commute a sentence at any time for any
reason without reference to any standards.”64
After noting these general differences between clemency and parole, the Solem
Court examined the particular characteristics of the clemency and parole processes
in the states at issue to assess the actual likelihood of release through these systems.
The Court noted that the “Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are very
different,”65 and “[i]n Rummel, the Court did not rely simply on the existence of
some system of parole”66 but “[r]ather it looked to the provisions of the system
presented, including the fact that Texas had ‘a relatively liberal policy of granting
“good time” credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a prisoner
serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as little as 12 years.’”67 In
contrast, in South Dakota, no life sentence had been commuted in more than eight
years.68 Moreover, the Court reasoned that “even if Helm’s sentence were
commuted, he merely would be eligible to be considered for parole,” and “[n]ot
only is there no guarantee that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole
system is far more stringent than the one before us in Rummel.”69
The Court again highlighted the relevance of release to Eighth Amendment
analysis in 2003 in Ewing v. California,70 where it upheld application of
California’s “three strikes” law to an individual convicted of felony grand theft for
stealing three golf clubs. There, the defendant was sentenced to life with the
possibility of parole after serving twenty-five years.71 In declining to find an Eighth
Amendment violation, the Court contrasted the sentence to one that did not allow
the possibility of release.72
In sum, Supreme Court cases prior to Graham recognized that the availability
of release is relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis. Indeed, Graham relied on
Rummel and Solem in emphasizing the “severity of sentences that deny convicts the
possibility of parole” and in rejecting executive clemency as an adequate
mechanism for providing a meaningful opportunity for release.73 Rummel and
Solem reveal that courts must look beyond the mere technical availability of a
release mechanism and examine how procedures actually operate in the specific

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 300–01.
Id. at 301.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280 (1980)).
Id. at 302.
Id. at 302–03.
538 U.S. 11 (2003).
Id. at 20.
See id. at 22.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
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state at issue. Central to the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis in these cases was
the timing of the opportunity for release, the standards governing the release
decision, and the actual likelihood of release.
These same matters considered in Solem and Rummel are relevant in
determining whether states are in compliance with Graham. Viewed in the context
of the Court’s earlier Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it is apparent that
Graham’s requirement that states provide a meaningful opportunity for release
encompasses three distinct components: (1) individuals must have a chance of
release at a meaningful point in time, (2) rehabilitated prisoners must have a
realistic likelihood of being released, and (3) the parole board or other releasing
authority must employ procedures that allow an individual a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. As discussed further below, as states respond to Graham
and Miller, significant questions emerge about the scope of each of these
components of the meaningful opportunity requirement. Before exploring the scope
of Graham’s mandate, I consider initial responses by states around the country to
Graham and Miller.
II. STATE RESPONSES TO GRAHAM AND MILLER
Nationwide, state courts, legislatures, and governors are responding to the
Graham and Miller decisions. For the most part, debate has centered on the issue of
when states should make juvenile offenders eligible for release. Thus far, relatively
little attention has been paid to the criteria and procedures that parole boards or
other releasing authorities should use in assessing a prisoner’s suitability for
release. Below, I examine state responses to Graham and Miller.
A. Responses by the Courts
Following Graham and Miller, a number of juvenile offenders serving LWOP or
otherwise lengthy sentences have sought relief from courts. As the discussion
below demonstrates, case law has focused primarily on when prisoners should
become eligible for release, and there has been little litigation yet about the criteria
and procedures that states should use when considering the suitability of prisoners
for release.
Timing issues have arisen when appellate courts have granted relief to prisoners
serving LWOP sentences and remanded the cases for resentencing. Some of these
decisions have converted LWOP sentences to life-with-parole sentences and either
have specified a particular time for parole eligibility or have left this timing
question for the sentencing court to determine at resentencing.74 For example, in
responding to claims of unconstitutional sentences in nonhomicide cases, courts in
Louisiana and Iowa converted LWOP sentences to sentences of life with the
possibility of parole. The Louisiana Supreme Court determined that the appropriate
remedy under Graham was to delete the parole eligibility restriction on a life
sentence, which made the prisoner eligible for parole after serving twenty years in

74. See infra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
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prison and reaching the age of forty-five.75 Similarly, the Iowa Supreme Court held
that Graham required severance of the no-parole restriction on an LWOP
sentence.76 This made the prisoner immediately eligible for parole consideration
under the standard Iowa parole statute.77 The Louisiana and Iowa courts did not
give any special direction to the parole board about the nature of the hearing that it
should ultimately provide to the prisoners.
Several courts have taken a similar approach in responding to Miller claims in
homicide cases and have converted LWOP sentences to sentences of life with the
chance of parole after a set number of years.78 For example, in Colorado, an
appellate court held that a juvenile offender’s mandatory LWOP sentence was
unconstitutional under Miller and that the appropriate penalty was the most serious
statutorily authorized penalty that was constitutionally permissible—life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole after forty years.79 In Massachusetts,
two trial courts have held post-Miller that mandatory LWOP sentences for firstdegree murder are unconstitutional, and individuals must instead be sentenced
pursuant to the second-degree murder statute, which provides a life sentence with
the possibility of parole after fifteen years.80
Some appellate courts responding to Miller claims have remanded LWOP cases
for resentencing and noted that courts may reimpose LWOP sentences if they first
consider the relevant mitigating factors. Some of these courts have remanded
without establishing an acceptable non-LWOP alternative sentence for the

75. State v. Shaffer, 2011-1756, p. 3–4 (La. 11/23/11); 77 So. 3d 939, 942 (per curiam);
see also State v. Mason, 2011-1190, p. 4–5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/11/12); 89 So. 3d 405, 408–09.
76. Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2010). Following Bonilla, Iowa
enacted legislation providing that juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide class A
felonies shall be eligible for parole only after serving twenty-five years. IOWA CODE § 902.1
(West Supp. 2013).
77. Bonilla, 791 N.W.2d at 702 n.3.
78. Courts are split on whether Miller applies retroactively to invalidate LWOP
sentences where inmates had already exhausted direct appeals prior to the Miller decision.
Compare State v. Tate, 2012-2763 (La. 11/5/13) (Miller not retroactive), People v. Carp,
828 N.W.2d 685 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (same), Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311
(Minn. 2013) (same), and Commonwealth v. Cunningham, No. 38 EAP 2012, 2013 WL
5814388 (Pa. Oct. 30, 2013) (same), with State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013) (Miller
retroactive), People v. Morfin, 981 N.E.2d 1010, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (same), and
Jones v. State, 2009-CT-02033-SCT (Miss. 2013); 2013 WL 3756564 (en banc) (same). In
cases before the Second and Eighth Circuits, the federal government conceded that Miller is
retroactive. See Wang v. United States, No. 13-2426 (2d Cir. July 16, 2013) (order granting
successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion); Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2013)
(per curiam).
79. People v. Banks, No. 08CA0105, 2012 WL 4459101, at *20–21 (Colo. App. Sept.
27, 2012), cert. granted, 2013 WL 3168752 (Colo. June 24, 2013) (No. 12SC1022)
(en banc).
80. Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 09-00963 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2012)
(memorandum of decision and order on the commonwealth’s motion to report questions);
Commonwealth v. Peirce, No. MICR2010-01188 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 2012)
(memorandum of decision and order on defendant’s motion to report questions). The cases
are now pending before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
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sentencing court to consider,81 whereas other courts have specified the acceptable
alternatives to LWOP. For example, the Alabama, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and
Wyoming supreme courts held their mandatory LWOP statutes unconstitutional as
applied to juvenile offenders and concluded that sentencing courts may impose
either LWOP or life with a parole eligibility date to be determined by the
sentencing court.82 The Arkansas and Missouri supreme courts have given
sentencing courts broader discretion to impose term-of-years sentences. In
Arkansas, the state supreme court remanded a mandatory LWOP case for
resentencing and directed the sentencing judge to impose a term of years between
ten and forty years, or life.83 The Missouri Supreme Court held that if the state
failed to persuade the sentencer beyond a reasonable doubt that LWOP was
appropriate, then the trial court should vacate the defendant’s first-degree murder
conviction and impose a sentence for second-degree murder, which is punishable
by a term of years between ten and thirty years, or life.84
Timing issues have also arisen in cases involving prisoners who are not
technically serving LWOP sentences but are instead serving lengthy term-of-years
sentences or life sentences that permit parole only after a very long period of time.
Some courts have held that only sentences that are actually LWOP sentences entitle
prisoners to relief under the Eighth Amendment—regardless of the length of the
sentence.85 Appellate courts are split on this issue in Florida, with several decisions

81. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, No. 14-09-01040-CR, 2012 WL 6484718 (Tex. App. Dec.
13, 2012); Washington v. State, 103 So. 3d 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Daugherty v.
State, 96 So. 3d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Simmons, 2011-1810
(La. 10/12/12); 99 So. 3d 28; cf. Rocker v. State, No. 2D10-5060, 2012 WL 5499975 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2012) (remanding for resentencing and noting that LWOP would not
be appropriate absent evidence that the juvenile shot the victim or intended that the victim be
killed).
82. See Ex Parte Henderson, Nos. 1120140 & 1120202 2013 WL 4873077 (Ala. Sept.
13, 2013) (refusing to dismiss capital felony charges requiring LWOP for juvenile
defendants and holding that the sentencing court may impose LWOP or life with parole);
Parker v. State, 2011-KA-01158-SCT (Miss. 2013), 119 So. 3d 987 (en banc) (remanding for
resentencing to LWOP or life with parole); Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013)
(same); Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, 294 P.3d 36 (Wyo. 2013) (same). Intermediate
appellate courts in some states have adopted the same approach. See People v. Eliason, 833
N.W.2d 357 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013) (remanding case for resentencing to LWOP or life with
parole).
83. Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175. This ruling followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s
remand of the case in the Miller/Jackson opinion. The Court rejected the state’s argument
that the LWOP sentence should be converted to a sentence of life with the possibility of
parole.
84. State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. 2013) (en banc).
85. See, e.g., Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012) (no relief on eighty-nineyear sentence); Goins v. Smith, No. 4:09-CV-1551, 2012 WL 3023306, at *6 (N.D. Ohio
July 24, 2012) (no relief on eighty-four-year sentence because “long, even life-long
sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders do not run afoul of Graham’s holding unless
the sentence is technically a life sentence without the possibility of parole”); State v. Brown,
2012-KP-0872 (La. 5/7/13); 2013 WL 1878911, at *15 (“In our view, Graham does not
prohibit consecutive term of year sentences for multiple offenses committed while a
defendant was under the age of 18, even if they might exceed a defendant’s lifetime . . . .”).
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finding lengthy term-of-years sentences unconstitutional under Graham86 and other
decisions denying relief even where the sentence plainly means the prisoner will
die in prison.87 The Florida Supreme Court is currently considering the issue.
The California Supreme Court concluded that a sentence of 110 years to life for
a nonhomicide crime committed by a juvenile offender violated Graham.88 The
court instructed the sentencing court on remand to
consider all mitigating circumstances attendant in the juvenile’s crime
and life, including but not limited to his or her chronological age at the
time of the crime, whether the juvenile offender was a direct perpetrator
or an aider and abettor, and his or her physical and mental
development, so that it can impose a time when the juvenile offender
will be able to seek parole from the parole board.89
The court noted that the “Board of Parole Hearings will then determine whether the
juvenile offender must be released from prison ‘based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation.’”90 Following this decision, lower appellate courts in California
have considered a number of cases where prisoners assert that their lengthy

The Virginia Supreme Court held that a life sentence provided a meaningful opportunity for
release under Graham because release was possible under the state’s conditional release
statute—which allows someone to petition for release and be subject to the ordinary paroleconsideration process after reaching the age of sixty and serving ten years in prison. Angel v.
Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386 (Va. 2011).
86. Adams v. State, No. 1D11-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Aug.
8, 2012) (reversing sentence of sixty years with mandatory term of fifty years); Floyd v.
State, 87 So. 3d 45, 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing eighty-year sentence). These
Florida cases granting relief have remanded for resentencing without giving any direction to
the sentencing courts about how to comply with Graham on resentencing. Parole was
abolished in Florida in 1994, and Florida courts have urged the legislature to create a
mechanism to comply with the Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 78 So.
3d 644, 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam). The parole board continues to hear cases
where the conviction occurred prior to 1994.
87. Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 374–75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming eightyyear sentence); Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming ninetyyear sentence); Thomas, 78 So. 3d at 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming fifty-year
sentence); Gridine v. State, 89 So. 3d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming seventy-year
sentence), review granted, 103 So. 3d 139 (Fla. 2012) (No. SC12-1223).
88. People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012); see also People v. J.I.A., 127 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 141, 149 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing sentence requiring minimum confinement
of 56.5 years), cause transferred 287 P.3d 70 (Cal. 2012) (No. S194841); People v. De Jesús
Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing sentence that precluded parole
for 175 years); People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (reversing
sentence precluding parole for eighty-four years).
89. Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295. The court noted that other prisoners could file habeas
petitions to allow the sentencing court “to weigh the mitigating evidence in determining the
extent of incarceration required before parole hearings,” and “[b]ecause every case will be
different, we will not provide trial courts with a precise time frame for setting these future
parole hearings in a nonhomicide case.” Id. at 295–96. A concurring justice argued that the
court should have ordered a full resentencing. Id. at 298–99 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 295 (majority opinion) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)).
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sentences are effectively LWOP. Relief has been granted in some of these cases
and denied in others.91
The Iowa Supreme Court held that that a juvenile offender serving a seventyfive-year sentence for second-degree murder and first-degree robbery, who would
not be eligible for parole for 52.5 years, was entitled to resentencing under Miller.92
The court also remanded for resentencing in a case of a juvenile offender serving a
fifty-year sentence for robbery and burglary. The court concluded that this
sentence, which did not permit parole consideration for thirty-five years, did not
provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” under Graham.93
In sum, post-Graham/Miller litigation has focused on when prisoners will
become eligible for relief, and little attention has been paid to the standards and
procedures that should be used when entities consider whether to grant release. One
exception has emerged in Michigan, where a federal district court held that
Michigan’s statute prohibiting parole in first-degree murder cases is
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as applied to juvenile offenders.94 In
November 2013, the court ordered the state to create “an administrative structure”
for the purpose of processing and determining the appropriateness of parole for
juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences.95 The court directed the state to give
“notice to all such persons who have completed 10 years of imprisonment that their
eligibility for parole will be considered in a meaningful and realistic manner.” In
addition, the state must schedule public hearing for “each of the eligible prisoners

91. See, e.g., People v. Richardson, No. A134783, 2013 WL 2432510 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 4, 2013) (sentence of thirty-five years to life affirmed for felony murder); People
v.
DeLeon, B226617, 2013 WL 785622 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2013) (“Eighth Amendment
does not categorically bar imposition of a sentence of 40 years to life for a homicide
committed by a juvenile who did not kill or intend to kill.”); People v. Argeta, 149 Cal. Rptr.
3d 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding for resentencing for juvenile sentenced to a
minimum aggregate of 100 years for aiding and abetting a murder despite the fact that
sentence on each charge separately was not life-equivalent). Currently pending before the
California Supreme Court is the question of whether an LWOP sentence imposed on a
juvenile for murder with special circumstances under section 190.5(b) of the Penal Code
violates the Eighth Amendment after Miller. People v. Gutierrez, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 249
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012), review granted, 290 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2013). Although section 190.5(b)
gives discretion for judges to impose a sentence of either LWOP or twenty-five years to life,
some appellate courts have interpreted the statute as establishing a presumption that LWOP
is the appropriate sentence. See People v. Moffett, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47, 55 (Cal. Ct. App.
2012) (citing cases and remanding for resentencing, stating that “[a] presumption in favor of
LWOP, such as that applied in this case, is contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of Miller,
which cautions that LWOP sentences should be ‘uncommon’”), review granted, 290 P.3d
1171 (Cal. 2013). The court in Moffett remanded for the sentencing court to determine
whether to impose LWOP or life with parole after twenty-five years.
92. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013).
93. State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 2013).
94. Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013) (opinion
and order granting in part and denying part plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and
denying defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment).
95. Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2013) (order requiring
immediate compliance with Miller).
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making application for consideration” and “[p]ut in place a process for preliminary
determination of appropriateness of submission of each eligible prisoner’s
application for parole to the entire Parole Board.” The Parole Board must explain
its decisions regarding whether to grant release and may not issue a “no interest”
order or anything “materially like” a “no interest” order. Vetoes by the sentencing
judge shall not be permitted and the proceedings “from an initial determination of
eligibility will be fair, meaningful, and realistic.” Finally, the court stated that “no
prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for a crime committed as a
juvenile will be deprived of any educational or training program which is otherwise
available to the general prison population.” The court gave the state until the end of
the year to comply with the order, or a special master may be appointed to oversee
compliance.
B. Legislative Approaches
In the wake of Graham and Miller, a number of states are considering
legislation to respond to the decisions, and some states have already enacted
legislation. With a few exceptions, the newly enacted statutes focus on the timing
of parole eligibility for juveniles and do not provide special criteria or procedures
for parole boards to consider in determining the suitability of these individuals for
release.
The new statutes can be divided into two categories. First, following Miller,
some states with mandatory LWOP schemes enacted new statutes that retain the
possibility of life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders in at least some
homicide cases but give judges discretion in these cases to impose sentences
allowing the possibility of parole after a set period of time. Second, several states
either eliminated LWOP sentences for juveniles entirely or provided opportunities
for individuals serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed as juveniles to
petition the court for sentence modification after a period of time.
Seven states fall within the first category and enacted statutes that retain LWOP
for juveniles but give judges greater discretion. Five of these states—North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Arkansas—provide no special
criteria or procedures for parole boards to follow in assessing those inmates who
receive parole-eligible sentences.96 In contrast, the Nebraska and Louisiana statutes
provide some special rules for parole boards to follow in juvenile cases.97
North Carolina was the first state to respond to Miller. The state’s new statute
gives discretion to judges in first-degree murder cases to impose either LWOP or
life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. North Carolina’s
legislation eliminated LWOP as an option if the person is convicted under the
felony murder doctrine. In those circumstances, the sentence must be life with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years.98

96. See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 106–17 and accompanying text.
98. S.B. 635, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012).
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Pennsylvania also passed legislation retaining life-without-parole sentences for
first-degree murder.99 However, as an alternative sentence for first-degree murder,
the judge may now impose a sentence with a minimum of thirty-five years to life
for youth ages fifteen to seventeen, and a minimum of twenty-five years to life for
youth under the age of fifteen.100 In second-degree murder cases, where LWOP
used to be mandatory, LWOP is no longer an option. Instead, youth ages fifteen to
seventeen must receive a minimum thirty-years-to-life sentence, and youth under
the age of fifteen must receive a minimum twenty-years-to-life sentence.101
Under Utah’s new statute, judges in aggravated first-degree murder cases may
impose LWOP or sentences that allow parole after at least twenty-five years.102
Arkansas also retained LWOP as an option for juveniles in some homicide cases
but now permits judges to impose sentences in those cases providing parole
eligibility after twenty-eight years.103 New legislation in South Dakota retains life
without parole as a sentencing option for judges in first- or second-degree murder
cases.104 However, judges in these cases now also have the option of imposing any
term-of-years sentence.105
Unlike the statutes described above, new statutes in Nebraska and Louisiana
address parole board hearing procedures for juveniles. Nebraska’s new legislation
retains life-without-parole sentences for juveniles but makes such sentences
discretionary.106 In class IA felony cases, judges may now impose a minimum
sentence of forty years,107 which allows parole eligibility after twenty years.108 The
Nebraska statute provides special criteria for the parole board to consider in
juvenile cases.109 Significantly, after an initial denial decision, the board must
consider the inmate for release every year after the denial.110

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

S.B. 850, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012).
Id.
Id.
S.B. 228, 2013 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013).
H.B. 1993, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
S.B. 39, 2013 Leg. Assemb., 88th Sess. (S.D. 2013).
See id.
Legis. B. 44, 103 Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013).
Id.
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-1,110 (West, WestlawNext through end of 2013 reg. sess.).
These factors are the following:
(a) The offender’s educational and court documents;
(b) The offender’s participation in available rehabilitative and educational
programs while incarcerated;
(c) The offender’s age at the time of the offense;
(d) The offender’s level of maturity;
(e) The offender’s ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of his or her
conduct;
(f) The offender’s intellectual capacity;
(g) The offender’s level of participation in the offense;
(h) The offender’s efforts toward rehabilitation; and
(i) Any other mitigating factor or circumstance submitted by the offender.
Neb. Legis. B. 44.
110. Id.
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New statutes enacted in Louisiana also address parole hearing procedures. The
first Louisiana statute, passed after Graham but before Miller, applies retroactively
to anyone serving an LWOP sentence for a crime committed under the age of
eighteen, except those convicted of first- and second-degree murder.111 Under the
statute, these inmates are eligible for parole after serving thirty years if various
criteria relating to rehabilitation have been met.112 The statute requires the parole
board to meet in a three-member panel when considering an eligible juvenile
offender for release, and, in determining if release is appropriate in these cases, the
parole board shall consider an “evaluation of the offender by a person who has
expertise in adolescent brain development and behavior and any other relevant
evidence pertaining to the offender.”113 The panel must also “render specific
findings of fact in support of its decision.”114 The second Louisiana statute, enacted
after Miller, allows parole eligibility for juvenile offenders after thirty-five years in
first- and second-degree murder cases—if the sentencing court determines that the
person is entitled to parole eligibility.115 Before imposing a life-without-parole
sentence, the court must hold a hearing and consider aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. LWOP sentences “should normally be reserved for the worst
offenders and the worst cases.”116 The statute adopts the same procedures and

111. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:574.4(D)(1) (Supp. 2013).
112. Id. The criteria for parole eligibility are the following:
(a) The offender has served thirty years of the sentence imposed.
(b) The offender has not committed any disciplinary offenses in the twelve
consecutive months prior to the parole eligibility date.
(c) The offender has completed the mandatory minimum of one hundred hours
of prerelease programming in accordance with R.S. 15:827.1.
(d) The offender has completed substance abuse treatment as applicable.
(e) The offender has obtained a GED certification, unless the offender has
previously obtained a high school diploma or is deemed by a certified educator
as being incapable of obtaining a GED certification due to a learning disability.
If the offender is deemed incapable of obtaining a GED certification, the
offender shall complete at least one of the following:
(i) A literacy program.
(ii) An adult basic education program.
(iii) A job skills training program.
(f) The offender has obtained a low-risk level designation determined by a
validated risk assessment instrument approved by the secretary of the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
(g) The offender has completed a reentry program to be determined by the
Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
(h) If the offender was convicted of aggravated rape, he shall be designated a
sex offender and upon release shall comply with all sex offender registration
and notification provisions as required by law.
Id.
113. Id. § 15.574.4(d)(2).
114. Id. § 15.574.4(d)(3).
115. H.B. 152, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013).
116. Id.

2014]

REVIEW FOR RELEASE

391

criteria for parole-release decisions as those applicable in the nonhomicide cases
addressed by the first legislation in Louisiana.117
The second category of statutes eliminates LWOP entirely for juvenile offenders
or provides the opportunity for individuals serving LWOP sentences for crimes
committed as juveniles to petition the court for sentence modification after a period
of time. Prior to Graham and Miller, Colorado enacted legislation prospectively
eliminating LWOP for individuals under the age of eighteen and providing that
those convicted of a class 1 felony must be sentenced to life with the chance of
parole after forty years.118 Texas also acted prior to Graham and Miller and passed
a statute providing that individuals under the age of seventeen convicted of capital
felony are subject to life sentences with the possibility of parole after forty years
rather than LWOP.119 Following Miller, Texas expanded this reform to reach
seventeen-year-olds as well.120 In addition, after Miller, Wyoming eliminated lifewithout-parole sentences for juveniles.121 Under the law, individuals convicted of
first-degree murder committed under the age of eighteen are subject to life
sentences with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years.122 The Colorado,
Texas, and Wyoming legislation provide no special procedures or criteria for the
parole board in these juvenile cases.
New legislation in Delaware also eliminated sentences of life without the
possibility of release for juveniles. Under the legislation, individuals serving
mandatory sentences of natural life without the possibility of release for crimes
committed as juveniles will now be resentenced and subject to a sentencing range
of twenty-five years to life.123 In addition, the law allows juveniles sentenced to
more than twenty years to petition for sentence modification. Modification requests
may be filed after thirty years for first-degree murder convictions and after twenty
years for all other cases.124 Inmates may receive subsequent reviews after five-year
intervals, with discretion for the court to lengthen the time between petitions.125
The statute does not provide criteria for the court to consider in determining
whether to grant a resentencing request. In contrast to all of the states described
above, Delaware’s statute does not rely on a parole board to assess a juvenile
offender’s suitability for release.
The California legislature has enacted two relevant statutes since Miller. First, in
September 2012, the governor signed Senate Bill 9, which allows individuals
sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed under the age of eighteen to petition the

117. Id.
118. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(I) (West 2013). The governor has
discretion to grant parole earlier if extraordinary mitigating circumstances exist. Id.
§ 17-22.5-403.7(2).
119. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.145(b) (West 2013).
120. S.B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013).
121. H.B. 23, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013).
122. Id. The Act also allows for parole if the juvenile’s sentence is commuted to a term of
years. It further provides that juvenile offenders will not be eligible for parole if they commit
specified acts after the age of eighteen. Id.
123. S.B. 9, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., sec. 6 (Del. 2013).
124. Id. sec. 4(d)(1)–(2), § 4202A.
125. Id. sec. 4(d)(3), § 4202A.
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court for resentencing after fifteen years if certain criteria are met.126 In cases where
the prisoner is serving LWOP as a result of conviction for first-degree murder with
special circumstances, the court may resentence the individual to life with the
possibility of parole after twenty-five years.127 This statute contained no provisions
addressing the nature of the future parole hearing.128
A year later, in September 2013, the governor signed a second bill,
Senate Bill 260, which creates special parole hearing procedures and criteria for
eligible juveniles.129 In particular, the statute requires the parole board to conduct
“youthful offender parole hearings” for eligible prisoners that “provide for a

126. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2013). The bill that was enacted
was S.B. 9, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). The statute applies retroactively to prisoners
currently serving LWOP sentences.
127. In California, youth ages sixteen and seventeen convicted of murder in the first
degree with special circumstances may be sentenced to LWOP or life with the chance of
parole after twenty-five years, in the discretion of the court. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(b)
(West 2008). Under the new legislation, the court can order a resentencing and convert the
LWOP sentence to life with the chance of parole after twenty-five years. See id.
§ 1170(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2013). If the court denies the first request for resentencing,
the inmate has two more opportunities to seek resentencing. Id. § 1170(2)(H).
128. The California legislation does contain criteria for the court to consider in
determining whether to grant the resentencing request. In particular, the court must consider
certain factors:
(i) The defendant was convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and
abetting murder provisions of law.
(ii) The defendant does not have juvenile felony adjudications for assault or
other felony crimes with a significant potential for personal harm to victims
prior to the offense for which the sentence is being considered for recall.
(iii) The defendant committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant.
(iv) Prior to the offense for which the sentence is being considered for recall,
the defendant had insufficient adult support or supervision and had suffered
from psychological or physical trauma, or significant stress.
(v) The defendant suffers from cognitive limitations due to mental illness,
developmental disabilities, or other factors that did not constitute a defense, but
influenced the defendant’s involvement in the offense.
(vi) The defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the
potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, availing himself or
herself of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs, if those programs
have been available at his or her classification level and facility, using selfstudy for self-improvement, or showing evidence of remorse.
(vii) The defendant has maintained family ties or connections with others
through letter writing, calls, or visits, or has eliminated contact with individuals
outside of prison who are currently involved with crime.
(viii) The defendant has had no disciplinary actions for violent activities in the
last five years in which the defendant was determined to be the aggressor.
Id. § 1170(d)(2)(F).
129. S.B. 260, 2013 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
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meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”130 In reviewing the prisoner’s suitability
for parole, the board “shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of
juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent
growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case
law.”131 The statute permits statements to be submitted to the board from “[f]amily
members, friends, school personnel, faith leaders, and representatives from
community-based organizations with knowledge about the individual before the
crime or his or her growth and maturity.”132 In addition, subject to several
exceptions,133 Senate Bill 260 provides that juvenile offenders will be eligible for
parole at a youthful offender parole hearing as follows: (1) those sentenced to
determinate sentences will be eligible after fifteen years, (2) those sentenced to less
than twenty-five years to life will be eligible after twenty years, and (3) those
sentenced to twenty-five years to life will be eligible after twenty-five years.134
Thus, in California, juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP can now petition the
court for resentencing pursuant to the provisions created by Senate Bill 9. If the
court grants resentencing and imposes a sentence of twenty-five years to life, the
prisoner will be considered for parole pursuant to the “youth offender parole
hearing” provisions of Senate Bill 260.
Several states are considering legislation that provides special criteria and
procedures for parole boards to use in juvenile cases. For example, legislation
considered last session by the Connecticut legislature would have eliminated
LWOP for juvenile offenders and created special parole eligibility rules for
juveniles serving lengthy sentences.135 Significantly, the bill provides for the

130. Id. § 4(e). The statute requires the board to “review and, as necessary, revise existing
regulations and adopt new regulations” to ensure a meaningful opportunity to obtain release for
eligible juvenile offenders. Id.
131. Id. § 5(c). In addition, the statute provides that
[i]n assessing growth and maturity, psychological evaluations and risk assessment
instruments, if used by the board, shall be administered by licensed psychologists
employed by the board and shall take into consideration the diminished culpability
of juveniles as compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any
subsequent growth and increased maturity of the individual.
Id. § 4(f)(1).
132. Id. § 4(f)(2).
133. The statute does not apply to juveniles sentenced under the three strikes law or
“Jessica’s law,” or sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Id. § 4(h). The bill
also excludes individuals convicted of some crimes committed after turning eighteen. Id.
134. Id. § 4(b)(1).
135. H.B. 6581, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013). H.B. 6581 passed the House
of Representatives by a vote of 137–4, but was not called for a vote in the state Senate before the
end of the legislative session. See Bill Status for Substitute for Raised H.B. No. 6581, CT.GOV,
http://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&bill_num
=6581&which_year=2013&SUBMIT1.x=0&SUBMIT1.y=0. Currently in Connecticut,
individuals convicted of murder, felony murder, and several other serious offenses are not
eligible for parole, and prisoners convicted of other violent felonies are eligible only after serving
85% of the sentence. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125a(b)–(c) (West Supp. 2013). The bill, as
amended by the House, provides parole eligibility for juvenile offenders after twelve years, or
60% of the sentence, whichever is longer. Under the bill, those serving more than fifty years
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appointment of counsel for indigent inmates twelve months prior to the parole
hearing.136 Regarding parole hearing procedures, the bill allows counsel for the
inmate and the prosecutor to provide written submissions, allows the board to hear
testimony of experts or other witnesses at the board’s request, and allows the
inmate and victim to make a statement at the hearing.137 The bill also provides
specific criteria for the board to consider in assessing release.138

(including life without parole) are eligible for parole after serving thirty years. The bill also
makes juveniles ineligible for murder with special circumstances, which carries a mandatory
life-without-parole sentence. The Connecticut Sentencing Commission recommended the
original legislative proposal, which provided parole eligibility after ten years or 50% of the
sentence served, whichever was longer, for those sentenced to less than sixty years and provided
for parole eligibility after thirty years for those sentenced to sixty years or more. Conn.
Sentencing
Comm’n,
Juvenile
Sentence
Reconsideration
Proposal,
CT.GOV,
http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjabout/sentencingcommission/20121129_juvenile
_sentence_reconsideration_proposal_r.pdf; Conn. Sentencing Comm’n, Miller v. Alabama
http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjabout/sentencingcommission
Proposal,
CT.GOV,
/20121129_miller_v_alabama_proposal_r.pdf .
136. Conn. H.B. 6581. The Connecticut proposal is the only state proposal thus far to include
a provision for appointment of counsel in the parole process. Note, however, that California and
Massachusetts provide counsel at all “lifer” parole hearings—i.e., those hearings for inmates
serving life sentences who are eligible for parole. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehabilitation, Life
Parole Process, CA.GOV, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/parole/life_parole_process/index.html; Second
Degree Lifer Parole Hearing Process, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/law-enforce-and
-cj/parole/trans-svcs-unit/second-degree-lifer-parole-hearing-process.html.
137. Conn. H.B. 6581.
138. The bill provides:
After such hearing, the board may allow such person to go at large on parole with
respect to any portion of a sentence that was based on a crime or crimes committed
while such person was under eighteen years of age if the board finds that such
parole release would be consistent with the factors set forth in subdivisions (1) to
(4), inclusive, of subsection (c) of section 54-300 and if it appears, from all
available information, including, but not limited to, any reports from the
Commissioner of Correction, that (A) there is a reasonable probability that such
person will live and remain at liberty without violating the law; (B) the benefits to
such person and society that would result from such person’s release to community
supervision substantially outweigh the benefits to such person and society that
would result from such person’s continued incarceration; and (C) such person has
demonstrated substantial rehabilitation since the date such crime or crimes were
committed considering such person’s character, background and history, as
demonstrated by factors including, but not limited to, such person’s correctional
record, the age and circumstances of such person as of the date of the commission
of the crime or crimes, whether such person has demonstrated remorse and
increased maturity since the date of the commission of the crime or crimes, such
person’s contributions to the welfare of other persons through service, such
person’s efforts to overcome substance abuse, addiction, trauma, lack of education
or obstacles that such person may have faced as a child or youth in the adult
correctional system, the opportunities for rehabilitation in the adult correctional
system and the overall degree of such person’s rehabilitation considering the nature
and circumstances of the crime or crimes.
Id.
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C. Clemency
Some states have responded to Graham and Miller by modifying sentences
through clemency grants.139 Following Miller, in Iowa, the governor commuted the
LWOP sentences being served by thirty-eight juvenile offenders to life sentences
with parole eligibility after sixty years.140 The Iowa Supreme Court later found that
this action did not render the sentences constitutional.141 In Nebraska, the Pardons
Board announced in November 2012 plans to conduct hearings for juvenile
offenders serving LWOP sentences.142 The Board, which is comprised of the
governor, state attorney general, and secretary of state, has the power to commute
sentences. Under the Board’s plan, the new minimum sentence for prisoners would
be fifty years.143 The Board notified inmates and victims shortly before the planned
hearings, and many objected to the plan, including defense lawyers and victims’
families.144 The hearings were canceled after a Nebraska judge enjoined the Board
from acting.145
Prior to Graham and Miller, in 2007, Colorado’s governor created a juvenile
clemency board with authority to review clemency requests by juvenile offenders
serving adult sentences.146 Juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences—who were

139. Before Miller, Anthony Thompson argued that clemency should be granted on a
systematic basis to juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences for homicide offenses. Anthony
C. Thompson, Clemency for Our Children, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2641 (2011). Professor
Thompson asserted that clemency was justified in light of the Court’s “inherently illogical”
conclusion in Graham that juvenile homicide offenders could continue to be subject to LWOP.
Id. at 2642.
140. See James Q. Lynch, Trish Mehaffey & Mike Wiser, Branstad Commutes Life
Sentences for 38 Iowa Juvenile Murderers, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids, Iowa) (July 7, 2012, 10:05
PM), http://thegazette.com/2012/07/16/branstad-commutes-life-sentences-for-38-iowa-juvenile
-murderers/.
141. Following the commutation, an Iowa trial court concluded that the clemency grant
failed to comply with Miller and held that one of these individuals, who had served twenty-five
years, should be immediately eligible for parole. See Chad Nation, Jeffrey Ragland, Sentenced
to Life at 17, May Soon be a Free Man, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Aug. 29, 2012, 1:47 AM),
http://www.omaha.com/article/20120829/NEWS/708299918/1694. The Iowa Supreme Court
affirmed. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013).
142. Todd Cooper, Pardon Board’s Plan to Resentence 27 Inmates Draws Chorus of
Objections, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Nov. 28, 2012, 1:51 PM), http://www.omaha.com
/article/20121128/NEWS/121129631/1690#pardon-board-s-plan-to-resentence-27-inmates
-draws-chorus-of-objections. The Board announced that it would hear only five minutes of
testimony in the juvenile cases from the Attorney General’s Office, the prosecutor involved in
the case, one victim representative, and one inmate representative. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Todd Cooper & Martha Stoddard, Judge Grants Injunction to Stop Hearings for
Juvenile Lifers, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Nov. 30, 2012, 10:38 PM), http://
www.omaha.com/article/20121130/NEWS/711299887/1694#judge-grants-injunction-to
-stop-hearings-for-juvenile-lifers.
146. See Colo. Exec. Order No. B 009 07 (2007); Thompson, supra note 139, at 2701–05
(discussing the creation of Colorado’s juvenile clemency board).
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unaffected by Colorado’s prospective elimination of LWOP for juveniles—are
eligible to apply for clemency after serving at least ten years in prison.147
III. EXISTING PAROLE BOARD STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES
As discussed above, state courts, legislatures, and governors have started to
respond to Graham and Miller. For the most part, states have simply made juvenile
offenders eligible for parole under existing parole board systems. States have been
focused primarily on the timing of eligibility for release, and most appear to assume
that existing state parole practices will provide the meaningful opportunity for release
required by the Eighth Amendment.
Historically, state parole boards have been able to make release decisions with
little oversight from the courts regarding the criteria and procedures used for these
decisions. In ordinary adult cases, there is no constitutional requirement that states
provide a parole release mechanism at all—determinate sentencing is entirely
lawful.148 Moreover, even when a state provides a parole release process, courts have
imposed few constraints.149 Graham promises to change the interaction among courts
and parole boards because the decision mandates a release mechanism that complies
with constitutional standards. Simply making a juvenile offender eligible for parole
under an existing parole system may not guarantee compliance with Graham’s
mandate.150
Before assessing whether existing state parole practices comply with Graham’s
meaningful opportunity requirement, one needs to have an understanding of the
systems actually in place. Below, I consider existing parole standards and procedures.
A. Standards for Assessing Parole Release Suitability
State parole boards have traditionally had great flexibility in terms of the criteria
that they use in making release decisions, and they have not been required to provide
a realistic opportunity for release to prisoners.151
The Supreme Court has long emphasized the discretionary nature of parole
decision making, observing that the parole release decision “depends on an amalgam
of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are purely subjective
appraisals by the Board members based upon their experience with the difficult and
sensitive task of evaluating the advisability of parole release.”152 In considering the

147. Thompson, supra note 139, at 2704.
148. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (per curiam) (“There is no right
under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners.” (citation
omitted)).
149. See infra notes 151–70 and accompanying text.
150. See infra note 345 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the benefits of
appellate review of parole board decisions to ensure a meaningful opportunity for release.
151. See W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate
Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 944 (2009) (“[A] parole
board is free to deny parole for whatever reason, on whatever facts, for however long.”).
152. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 10 (1979). The
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suitability of a prisoner for release, parole boards have typically considered factors
including the prisoner’s background; the seriousness of the original offense; the
prisoner’s level of remorse; the degree of the prisoner’s rehabilitation; the views of
the victim, prosecutor, and community members; the potential danger to the
community if the prisoner is released; and whether a release plan is in place that will
provide the supportive services necessary for successful integration into the
community.153 More recently, parole boards have focused increasingly on the degree
of danger presented by the inmate.154
In many states, the chance of obtaining parole is slim, particularly if the
underlying offense was violent. Sharon Dolovich observes that “[w]hat in the middle
decades of the 20th century was a meaningful process in which parole boards
seriously considered individual claims of rehabilitation has become in most cases a
meaningless ritual in which the form is preserved but parole is rarely granted.”155 In
some states, parole boards release only a small percent of individuals eligible for
release. For example, in 2011 in Ohio, 6.9% of prisoners were granted release after
release consideration hearings.156 In Florida, 3.5% of parole release decisions resulted
in a grant of parole in fiscal year 2011–2012.157
Board members have few incentives to release individuals convicted of violent
crimes, and plenty of disincentives. When a parolee commits a violent crime after
release—which will inevitably happen in at least a small percentage of cases—parole
boards face major public criticism.158 Such events may cause parole release rates
within a state to shift over time.159 The nature of the crime of conviction is often the
driving force in parole decisions.160

Court noted that the parole release decision “turns on a ‘discretionary assessment of a
multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a man is and what he may become
rather than simply what he has done.’” Id. (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the
Expert—Counsel in the Penal Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 813 (1961)).
153. Bierschbach, supra note 12, at 1750–51.
154. Id. at 1751.
155. Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE:
AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 110–11 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds.,
2012).
156. OHIO ADULT PAROLE AUTH., PAROLE BOARD REPORT 1 (2012), available at http://
www.drc.ohio.gov/web/Reports/ParoleBoard/Calendar%20Year%202011%20Report.pdf.
157. See FLA. PAROLE COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2011–12, at 18–19, available at https://
fpc.state.fl.us/PDFs/FPCannualreport201112.pdf. In both Ohio and Florida, parole was
eliminated in the mid-1990s, but it remains available for inmates sentenced under the old
regimes. In contrast, in Texas the overall parole approval rate for fiscal year 2011 was 31%.
TEX. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FY 2011, at 4, available at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/publications/BPP%20StatisticalReport_08-08-2012.pdf.
158. See, e.g., Maria Cramer & Jonathan Saltzman, ’09 Parole of Officer’s Killer Gets
Hard Look, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 29, 2010, at B1.
159. Ishan Taylor, Halting Parole Spurs Concerns of Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007,
at O6 (discussing impact of triple homicide by parolees on parole release rates in
Connecticut); After Board Shakeup, Parole Rates Down in 2011, WBUR (Aug. 9, 2011),
http://www.wbur.org/2011/08/09/massachusett-parole-rates (noting that parole release rates
were down in Massachusetts after governor changed composition of board in wake of
murder of police officer by parolee).
160. Ball, supra note 151, at 900–01.

398

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:373

Recent litigation in California has challenged exclusive reliance on the offense
in denying parole. In California, parole decisions must be based on certain statutory
factors, and courts have found that due process requires that board decisions
considering these factors be supported by “some evidence.”161 In 2008, the
California Supreme Court held that the “some evidence” standard was not satisfied
where the governor reversed the parole board’s recommendation for parole release
based solely on the nature of the inmate’s offense.162 The decision may have had
some impact on release rates. A 2011 study of the California parole system found
that “an inmate’s chance of being granted parole has increased in the last two
years.” However, the study also concluded that “the length of time he or she must
wait for a subsequent hearing when denied parole has also increased.”163 Overall,
the chance of an inmate serving a life sentence being granted parole by the board
and not having the decision reversed by the governor was approximately 6% in
2010.164
Despite the California example, court oversight of substantive parole decisions
is rare. For example, the Second Circuit recently rejected a challenge to New
York’s parole release process, holding that the state’s alleged unofficial policy to
deny parole to all violent felony offenders was not unconstitutional.165 States have,
for the most part, been free to set their own criteria for release and have had great
discretion in determining how realistic to make the possibility of release for
prisoners.166 Unless state statutes specifically provide a basis for court oversight,
courts have been largely uninvolved in monitoring parole decisions.
B. Existing Parole Board Procedures: A National Survey
In addition to having discretion over the criteria used for release decisions, states
have also had great leeway in the procedures used by their parole boards in
considering release. Under the federal constitution, parole release procedures need
not comply with even minimal due process standards. In Greenholtz v. Inmates of
the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex,167 the Supreme Court held that the

161. In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 546–48 (Cal. 2008).
162. Id. at 555. In California, the governor can reverse decisions of the parole board.
163. ROBERT WEISBERG, DEBBIE A. MUKAMAL & JORDAN D. SEGALL, STANFORD
CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., LIFE IN LIMBO: AN EXAMINATION OF PAROLE RELEASE FOR
PRISONERS SERVING LIFE SENTENCES WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA 4
(2011), available at http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/newsfeed/files/2011/09/SCJC_report
_Parole_Release_for_Lifers.pdf.
164. Id. There has been fluctuation in the rate of reversals of the board’s release decisions
by the governor. As of April 2011, Governor Jerry Brown had overruled fewer than 20% of
the parole dates approved by the board. In contrast, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
overruled 70% of decisions, and Governor Gray Davis reversed 98%. Bob Egelko, Life with
Parole About a 20-year Term, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 16, 2011, at C2.
165. Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). In New York, as of
2009, the initial parole release rate was 8% for individuals serving life sentences for A-1
violent felonies, with the subsequent parole release rate at 13%. Alan Rosenthal, Patricia
Warth & Andy Correia, Parole Reform, ATTICUS, Winter 2011, at 27, 27.
166. See Ball, supra note 151, at 944.
167. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
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mere existence of a parole release process does not create a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in parole release. The Court nevertheless found that
because Nebraska’s parole statute created an expectation of release, minimal due
process standards were required in that instance.168 However, following Greenholtz,
states can avoid creating protected liberty interests by adopting statutes and
regulations that make parole release discretionary. In other words, statutes
providing that a parole board “may” (rather than “shall”) release a prisoner if
various criteria are met do not create a liberty interest.169 Moreover, even if the
language of a particular state statute creates a liberty interest in parole release, the
due process protections that will attach are quite modest.170
Thus, states have been able to adopt parole release procedures free from federal
constitutional constraints. Graham raises the question of whether these existing
procedures will provide meaningful hearings for juvenile offenders. To assess this
question, one must understand the nature of the parole procedures actually in place.
Yet there is little recent scholarship regarding parole release processes171 and no
up-to-date information compiled regarding the procedures currently used by parole
boards around the country.172
To fill this void, this Article provides a comprehensive examination of parole
release procedures nationwide. In June 2012, I sent a survey to the chairs of the
parole releasing authorities in the forty-nine states where such authorities

168. Id. at 12; see also Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) (Montana statute
created a liberty interest in parole). Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin v.
Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), which rejected the view that a state regulation created a liberty
interest for purposes of prison disciplinary proceedings, some scholars questioned whether
Greenholtz remained good law. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 151, at 947. However, the Court’s
more recent decision in Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859 (2011) (per curiam), explicitly
relies on Greenholtz. Id. at 862–63.
169. See, e.g., Bryant v. Maryland, 848 F.2d 492, 493 (4th Cir. 1988) (no right to a
hearing because no protected liberty interest in parole); Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215,
1217–18 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868, 869–70 (10th Cir.
1981).
170. In Greenholtz, the Court found that a formal evidentiary hearing was not required
for every inmate and refused to require that every adverse parole decision include a
statement of the evidence relied upon. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15.
171. Some articles about parole board decision making were published in the 1970s,
when indeterminate sentencing came under scrutiny. See, e.g., Project, Parole Release
Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 814–17 (1975); Comment,
The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 284–86 (1971). Although there are several
examples of more recent scholarship, see, e.g., Ball, supra note 151; Dolovich, supra note
155; Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole
Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 567–69 (1994), parole has received relatively little academic
attention.
172. It appears that the only attempt at collection of information about parole boards
nationwide has come from the Association of Paroling Authorities International (APAI).
APAI conducted a survey in 2007 that asked parole boards various questions about the
procedures used in parole release decisions. See SUSAN C. KINNEVY & JOEL M. CAPLAN, CTR.
FOR RESEARCH ON YOUTH & SOC. POLICY, FINDINGS FROM THE APAI’S INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF RELEASING AUTHORITIES (2008), available at http://www.apaintl.org/documents
/surveys/2008.pdf. APAI has not updated this survey.
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operate.173 In all, forty-five states responded to the survey.174 Below, the results of
the survey are reviewed.175
1. Direct Interaction with Inmates
One set of questions in the survey focused on the nature of the interaction
between the decision makers on the parole board and the prisoner. Forty-three state
boards conduct interviews or hearings with inmates, in at least some cases, as part
of the parole release process. Two states (Alabama and North Carolina) report that
interaction with the inmate is not part of the process in any case. Nine boards call
these interactions with inmates “interviews,”176 thirty states categorize them as
“hearings,”177 and four use both terms.178 Nine boards conduct these proceedings
exclusively in person.179 Eight boards rely exclusively on videoconferencing or
telephone.180 The remaining boards use some combination of in-person meetings,
video conferencing, and telephone hearings.181

173. Releasing authorities have somewhat different names in different states. For
simplicity, this Article refers to all state releasing authorities as “parole boards.” Maine does
not have a parole release process.
174. Surveys were received from every state except for Arizona, Indiana, Mississippi,
and Oklahoma.
175. The survey asked states the following question: “Do any special procedures or
guidelines apply when the inmate being considered for parole release is serving a sentence
based on an offense committed as a juvenile?” Follow-up with states that answered yes to
this question revealed that some boards use special criteria relating to age at the time of the
offense in assessing parole eligibility or suitability, but none of the boards use different
procedures in considering these cases. Note that California, Louisiana, and Nebraska have
since enacted statutes with special procedures governing parole in some cases involving
juvenile offenders. See supra notes 106–17, 126–34 and accompanying text.
176. Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin.
177. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
178. Connecticut, Idaho, Massachusetts, and Wyoming.
179. California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Texas,
and Wyoming. Georgia reports that a parole staff member interviews an inmate in person as
part of the “parole consideration process.” However, this will typically occur during the
“initial prison diagnostic process.”
180. Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, and
South Carolina.
181. Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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Figure 1. Type of hearing or interview

In some states, the individual or individuals speaking directly with the inmate in an
interview or hearing is not the same person or group that makes the decision regarding
release. The survey defined “releasing authority member” as an individual with the
authority by law to make parole release decisions. Twenty-four boards use panels
comprised exclusively of releasing authority members for interviews or hearings with
inmates, and panels range in size from two to seven members.182 Four boards use
individual members of releasing authorities to conduct interviews or hearings with
inmates,183 and one state uses an individual member in some instances and a panel in
other instances.184 Three boards conduct interviews using exclusively employees of the
releasing authority who lack decision-making authority.185 Eleven boards use nondecision makers to conduct at least some of the interviews or hearings.186
In several states, a hearing occurs in front of the decision makers, but the inmate is
not present.187 For example, in Florida, an inmate is interviewed by an employee of the
releasing authority, and then the decision makers conduct a separate hearing that the
prosecutor, victim, and others may attend. Alabama’s board has no direct interaction
with the prisoner at all, but decision makers conduct a hearing with other participants.

182. Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.
183. Arkansas, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
184. Kansas.
185. Florida, Georgia, and Virginia.
186. Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah.
187. Florida and Alabama.
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2. Role of Counsel for the Prisoner
A second set of questions focused on the role of counsel for prisoners at parole
release hearings. Thirty-nine boards report that input from an inmate’s attorney is
considered by the board in the parole release decision, and six boards do not consider
input from a prisoner’s attorney at all.188 Thirty-two boards allow attorneys the
opportunity to make an in-person statement,189 with seven allowing attorney input only
through some combination of written, telephone, or videotaped correspondence.190
Fourteen boards do not permit an attorney to be present at all for the inmate’s interview
or hearing,191 with one state allowing the attorney to be present only at some types of
hearings.192 Florida and Alabama do not permit an inmate to appear at the hearing
before the releasing authority members, but do permit an attorney to appear and speak
at this hearing.
only written,
telephone, or
video input
from attorney
permitted
16%

no attorney
input
permitted
13%

in-person input
from attorney
permitted
71%

Figure 2. Input from prisoner’s attorney

188. The six states that do not consider attorney input are Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa,
Michigan, New Mexico, and Vermont. New Mexico noted that written information may be
submitted but does not weigh in the decision.
189. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. In some states, this in-person input from the attorney is not permitted at the time
of the inmate’s interview or hearing, but rather is allowed at a separate meeting.
190. Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah, and
Wisconsin.
191. Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
192. Massachusetts.
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Thirty-five boards permit an attorney for the inmate to present a written report
from a mental health professional who has evaluated the inmate,193 with twentythree of those boards also allowing the attorney to present oral testimony or a
statement from the expert.194 Twenty boards allow attorneys to present the oral
testimony or statements of other witnesses at some types of hearings.195
Ten boards report that they can appoint an attorney to represent an indigent
inmate in the parole release process in at least some cases at no cost to the
inmate.196 New Jersey reports that it would appoint counsel only if the prisoner was
“incompetent to understand the nature of the parole hearing.” Similarly, Tennessee
states that appointment of counsel “would occur in situations where offender is
mentally challenged or physically incapacitated.” In Ohio, public defenders
represent inmates at all full board open hearings, which occur only after the board
votes to recommend release and the prosecutor, victim, or court objects. In
Massachusetts and California, individuals serving life sentences with the chance of
parole have a right to appointed counsel. The remaining thirty-five states report that
they do not appoint counsel in any parole release case.
3. Role of the Prosecutor
Forty-three boards reported that they consider input from the prosecutor’s office
in making a parole release decision. Of these boards, thirty allow an in-person
statement from the prosecutor at an interview, hearing, or in-person meeting.197
Thirteen allow input only through written correspondence, telephone interview, or
videotaped correspondence.198 Two states (New Mexico and Wyoming) do not
consider input from prosecutors in making the release decision.199

193. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
194. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming.
Massachusetts reported allowing attorneys to present oral testimony or a statement from a
mental health expert at just some types of hearings.
195. Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Massachusetts reported allowing attorneys to
present oral testimony or statements of other witnesses at just some types of hearings.
196. California, Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon,
Tennessee, and Washington.
197. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
198. Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
199. New Mexico noted that written information may be submitted but does not weigh in
the decision.

404

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:373

no prosecutor
input
permitted
4%

only written,
telephone, or
video input
from
prosecutor
permitted
29%

in-person input
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67%

Figure 3. Input from prosecutor

Sixteen boards allow the prosecutor to present testimony or statements from
witnesses at the parole release hearing or interview.200 Of these boards, only one
(New Hampshire) allows the inmate or his attorney to cross-examine the
witnesses.201 New Hampshire also allows the prosecutor to cross-examine the
inmate at the hearing and to cross-examine individuals who make statements on
behalf of the inmate.202
4. Victim Input
All boards responding to the survey consider input from the victim or victim’s
representative in the parole release decision.203 All boards except for one allow the

200. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, and
Tennessee.
201. Massachusetts responded “maybe” to this question, and South Dakota said “it had
never come up” previously, but the board would allow it if it did.
202. Massachusetts responded “maybe” to this question.
203. Some states have statutory or constitutional requirements regarding victim
participation in parole proceedings. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1(A)(9) (victim has
right “[t]o be heard at any proceeding when any post-conviction release from confinement is
being considered”); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8(2)(c) (victim has right to be “[h]eard at all
proceedings for the . . . release of a convicted person after trial”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 56.02 (a)(7) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (providing victims with the right to
“participate in the parole process”); see also Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime
Victim: Evaluating Victim Input at Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME & JUST. 347, 382–99
(2009) (discussing victim input in the parole release decision-making process).
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victim to make an in-person statement at an interview or hearing. Pennsylvania
permits only written or videotaped correspondence.
5. Other Input
Forty-four boards report that written case history and summaries of the inmate’s
background are compiled for consideration by the board in the parole release
decision.204 In twelve states, an employee of the board compiles these
summaries.205 In twenty-one states, an employee of the department of corrections
compiles these summaries.206 Eleven states use a combination of department of
corrections and board employees to compile summaries.207
Forty-three boards consider input from others who know the inmate (such as
family members, employers, relationship group members, teachers, or
counselors).208 In twenty-nine states, input may be provided from at least some of
these categories of individuals through an in-person statement at an interview,
hearing, or other form of meeting.209 Thirteen states permit this form of input only
by written, telephone, or videotaped correspondence.210
6. Access to Information
Twenty-eight boards prevent inmates from full access to information provided
by the prosecutor’s office,211 and thirty-seven boards prevent inmates from full
access to input provided by the victim or victim’s representative.212 When a mental

204. In Oregon, summaries are compiled in only some types of cases. New Mexico
reports that the board members consider the entire inmate’s file.
205. Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington.
206. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
207. Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio,
Oregon, Tennessee, and Virginia.
208. In Alaska, input from such individuals is not considered. New Mexico reports that
input from such individuals may be submitted in writing, but will not weigh in the decision.
209. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Massachusetts
reported that in-person input from these individuals is permitted only at some types of
hearings.
210. California, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
211. Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
212. Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
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health professional employed by the parole board conducts an evaluation of an
inmate for the board’s consideration, twelve states do not permit inmates to see the
conclusions and recommendations of the professional.213
IV. CONSIDERING THE SCOPE OF GRAHAM’S MANDATE TO THE STATES
As discussed, states around the country have started to respond to Graham and
Miller. A number of states have simply made juvenile offenders eligible for parole
under existing state parole regimes, and other states are considering this approach.
The survey results described above detail existing parole board procedures in states
around the country. Next, I explore the scope of Graham’s meaningful opportunity
requirement. Then, informed by the survey results, I consider whether state
responses to Graham and Miller are satisfying the Supreme Court’s mandate.
A. Timing Questions
A first question relates to timing in assessing a state’s compliance with the
Eighth Amendment requirement that it provide a “meaningful opportunity” for
release. The Court declined in Graham to specify when during the course of a
juvenile offender’s incarceration states must offer the chance of release in
nonhomicide cases. Miller similarly did not articulate what type of sentence would
be an acceptable alternative to LWOP in homicide cases.
Even prior to Graham, the Court found that the timing of eligibility for release
bears on the severity of the sentence under Eighth Amendment analysis. In
Rummel, the prisoner’s eligibility for parole after twelve years was significant to
the Court’s decision to uphold the sentence against an Eighth Amendment
challenge.214 In Graham, the Court emphasized the role that a prisoner’s hope for
release plays in assessing the severity of a sentence.215 A sentence that deprives a
prisoner of a sense of hope regarding the future is uniquely punitive. The Court
reasoned that “life without parole sentences share some characteristics with death
sentences that are shared by no other sentences.”216 Although the state does not
execute the prisoner, “the sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is
irrevocable” and “deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving
hope of restoration.”217 The Court stated:
As one court observed in overturning a life without parole sentence for
a juvenile defendant, this sentence “means denial of hope; it means that
good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that

Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
213. Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
214. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1980).
215. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
216. Id.
217. Id.
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whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the
convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days.”218
The Court further observed: “Life in prison without the possibility of parole
gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation
with society, no hope.”219
As Alice Ristroph has argued, Graham should be understood to mean not only
that states cannot deny hope to juvenile offenders but also that “the state is not to
abandon hope for the juvenile’s eventual rehabilitation.”220 In other words, both the
prisoner’s sense of hope and society’s sense of hope for the prisoner are relevant.
The state should not “mak[e] the judgment at the outset” to give up on a teenager
and imprison him for life.221 Rather, the state should allow at least the possibility
that someone of that age can change and contribute to society.
At the very least, Graham requires states to give eligible juvenile offenders a
chance of release before they are expected to die. Otherwise, the sentence fails to
offer any hope to the prisoner and does not mitigate its severity. Thus, even if a life
sentence offers the chance of parole, it will violate Graham if release is not
possible until after a prisoner is expected to die. The Iowa governor’s commutation
of LWOP sentences to sentences of life with the possibility of parole after sixty
years falls in this category of inadequate responses to the Court’s Eighth
Amendment holding.222 Under the governor’s response, prisoners would not be
eligible for release until their mid-to-late seventies at the earliest, and they may
well have died in prison before that time. Similarly, a no-parole, term-of-years
sentence that will imprison a juvenile offender past his life expectancy plainly
violates Graham.223
But what about a sentence of thirty or forty years, which would probably allow a
prisoner the chance of release before death, but which would mean that release

218. Id. (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)).
219. Id. at 2032. Studies confirm that juvenile offenders serving LWOP or other lengthy
sentences indeed experience extreme feelings of hopelessness. Negative psychological
effects of imprisonment typically increase as someone serves a sentence, and then begin to
reverse as release approaches. John J. Gibbs, The First Cut Is the Deepest: Psychological
Breakdown and Survival in the Detention Setting, in THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 97 (Robert
Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1982); Stanton Wheeler, Socialization in Correctional
Communities, 26 AM. SOC. REV. 697 (1961). For those serving LWOP sentences, the reverse
effect is not experienced. Moreover, those who enter prison at a young age are likely to
suffer the most. Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for
Postprison Adjustment, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED 33 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul
eds., 2003); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL TASK
FORCE ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE 190 (2012) (“[M]ost adult jails or prisons are illequipped to meet the needs of children or keep them safe. They are much more likely to
commit suicide in an adult jail than in a juvenile facility.” (citations omitted)).
220. Ristroph, supra note 6, at 75.
221. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
222. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
223. Several courts have held as much, whereas other courts have held that Graham
applies only to “life” sentences and not term-of-years sentences, regardless of their length.
See supra notes 85–91 and accompanying text.
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could not come until quite late in life? How soon before expected death must the
chance for release come to make the opportunity “meaningful”? This issue arose
during the litigation of Graham. The petitioner’s brief in Graham referenced
Colorado law, which prohibits LWOP for juvenile offenders convicted of the most
serious crimes and makes them eligible for parole after forty years.224 At oral
argument in Graham, upon questioning from Justice Alito, petitioner’s counsel
stated that the Colorado statute was “probably . . . constitutional.”225 Justice Alito’s
dissent referenced this statement: “Nothing in the Court’s opinion affects the
imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole. Indeed,
petitioner conceded at oral argument that a sentence of as much as forty years
without the possibility of parole ‘probably’ would be constitutional.”226 Justice
Thomas’s dissent similarly referenced Colorado’s statute and counsel’s statement at
oral argument.227 However, the majority opinion in Graham did not elaborate on
the timing issue but simply asserted that states must provide juvenile offenders with
a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”
Although some might assert that providing the chance for release after forty
years’ imprisonment fulfills Graham’s mandate, the better view is that a
“meaningful opportunity” for release means that review should come at a point in
time that provides the prisoner with the chance to live a meaningful life outside of
prison. Thus, Graham should not be understood to mean simply that a prisoner
must have a chance to be released shortly prior to his expected date of death.
Rather, for the chance of release to be meaningful, review must occur at a point in
time that will give a prisoner a sense of hope about the future and that reflects
society’s hope that the prisoner can rejoin society in a meaningful way. A young
prisoner contemplating spending at least thirty to forty years in prison—a much
longer span of time than he or she has lived outside of prison—will almost
certainly experience a profound sense of hopelessness. Such a sentence means
being incarcerated past the typical childbearing age, past the timeframe in which
one could start a meaningful career, and past the age in which one could expect
parents or other former caregivers to still be alive. In contrast, providing a juvenile
with hope that he or she may someday lead a meaningful life outside of prison will
encourage efforts at rehabilitation.228
As noted, a federal judge in Michigan has ordered the state to consider juvenile
offenders for parole after they have served ten years in prison.229 This timing for

224. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 17, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412).
225. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412).
226. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting).
227. Justice Thomas noted: “In light of the volume of state and federal legislation that
presently permits life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, it would
be impossible to argue that there is any objective evidence of agreement that a juvenile is
constitutionally entitled to a parole hearing any sooner than 40 years after conviction.” Id. at
2057–58 n.13 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
228. Cf. id. at 2032 (majority opinion) (“A young person who knows that he or she has
no chance to leave prison before life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible
individual.”). By giving prisoners a chance of a meaningful life outside of prison, prisons
can encourage good behavior.
229. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. A bill introduced in the U.S. Congress
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release eligibility would provide prisoners with a sense of hope and would allow
individuals the chance to live meaningful lives outside of prison. Given Graham’s
emphasis on adolescent brain development and maturation,230 it would be logical to
tie the timing of an initial review to when one can expect an individual to have
obtained a fully mature brain and a more stable character. Brain and character
maturation typically occurs by the time someone reaches his or her early
twenties.231 Thus, juvenile offenders could be expected to undergo significant
change by a ten-year mark.
Another source of guidance comes from the current draft of the American Law
Institute’s Model Penal Code (MPC) for sentencing, which recommends a “second
look” at juvenile sentences after ten years.232 Under the MPC’s proposed provision,
an individual serving a prison sentence for a crime committed under the age of
eighteen would be able to petition a court for a sentence modification after serving
ten years in prison.233 The MPC draft recommends a second-look procedure for
most adult offenders as well, and would allow these prisoners to petition the court
for a sentence modification after serving fifteen years in prison.234 Under both the
adult and juvenile provisions, the judicial panel (or other judicial decision maker)
could shorten the sentence at this later point in time if the modified sentence would
better serve the purposes of sentencing.235 The MPC recommends a shorter time
frame for review of juvenile offender cases because “adolescents can generally be
expected to change more rapidly in the immediate post-offense years, and to a
greater absolute degree, than older offenders.”236
Graham and Miller do not resolve whether states can adopt bright-line rules on
timing for eligibility for release, or whether sentencing courts must have discretion
to set a particular date for release consideration based on the individual
would have required states to adopt policies to grant juvenile offenders serving sentences of
more than fifteen years a meaningful opportunity for parole or supervised release at least
once during their first fifteen years of incarceration, and at least once every three years
thereafter. The bill was not enacted. Juvenile Justice Accountability and Improvement Act of
2011, H.R. 3305, 112th Cong. (2011).
230. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
231. See, e.g., Brief for the American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric
Association, National Association of Social Workers & Mental Health America as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22–27, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412), 2009 WL
2236778; Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain,
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCES, June 2004, at 77, 77.
232. The American Law Institute (ALI) has been working since 1999 to develop the
MPC for sentencing. The most recent draft of the MPC was approved by the ALI
membership at its 2011 Annual Meeting. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011).
233. Id. § 6.11A(h).
234. Id. § 305.6. The one narrow exception to the adult offender second-look provision
would be in cases where a life-without-parole sentence is the “sole alternative to a death
sentence.” Id. § 305.6 cmt. (b)(2).
235. The goal of such review hearings is to determine “whether the purposes of
sentencing . . . would better be served by a modified sentence than the prisoner’s completion
of the original sentence.” Id. § 305.6(4).
236. Id. § 6.11A cmt. h. The proposal also recommends absolute caps on juvenile
sentences that are below adult maximums. Id. § 6.11A cmt. g.

410

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:373

circumstances of the offense and offender. Most legislative responses thus far have
cabined judicial discretion by requiring juvenile offenders to serve lengthy
mandatory minimum sentences prior to any parole eligibility.237 However, the
California Supreme Court adopted an individualized approach with respect to
Graham claims and instructed sentencing courts to consider the particular
circumstances of the offense and offender in setting a parole eligibility date.238
Given Miller’s focus on individualized sentencing, and emphasis that life-long
sentences for juveniles should be “uncommon,” statutes like Pennsylvania’s that
give judges the option of imposing LWOP or a sentence of thirty-five years to life
are contrary to the spirit of the decision and may well be unconstitutional.
It bears noting that while review of a sentence under Graham cannot come too
late, it also cannot come too early. If the opportunity for release for a juvenile
offender comes too soon after conviction, the prisoner will not have had a
meaningful chance to rehabilitate. A number of states have sentence review
mechanisms that provide for court review of sentences.239 However, if sentence
review must be sought close in time to sentencing, then it does not provide the sort
of “second look” procedure contemplated by Graham. Graham requires a
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”240 Therefore, there must be an opportunity to seek release after a
juvenile offender has had enough time to mature and change.241

237. See supra Part II.A.
238. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. Another timing issue not resolved by
Graham and Miller is the length of parole supervision that may follow release. Can a juvenile
offender released by the parole board be subject to parole supervision for the rest of his or her life?
Does the Constitution place any limit on the type of parole violations that can justify revocation
and imprisonment for the remainder of the life sentence? Under existing parole systems, the
conditions of parole release can be extremely stringent and quite punitive in and of themselves.
Moreover, a minor and noncriminal misstep such as missing a curfew can land a parolee back in
prison. Arguably, Graham and Miller bear on these post-release issues.
239. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4037(A) (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-195
(West 2005). For a discussion of state appellate sentencing review, see Daniel E. Wathen,
Disparity and the Need for Sentencing Guidelines in Maine: A Proposal for Enhanced Appellate
Review, 40 ME. L. REV. 1, 3 n.9 (1988). Sentencing review under these statutes typically requires
filing a request shortly after sentencing. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-195 (application
must be filed within thirty days of sentencing). In Connecticut, the Sentence Review Division
cannot consider post-sentencing rehabilitation in reviewing the appropriateness of the sentence.
See Miller v. Warden, No. 556724, 2002 WL 1724044, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 26, 2002).
240. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
241. Another problem with coming before the parole board “too early” is that it is not atypical
for juvenile offenders to have difficulty adjusting to prison in their early years, and they may have
disciplinary problems as a result. Many individuals convicted as juveniles are placed directly in
adult prison and they may not yet have the skills to handle the conflicts and threats that occur
regularly in prison. As a result, they may react by fighting or engaging in other aggressive
behavior. These problems are compounded if the child is mentally ill or has been exposed to
trauma. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 219, at 110. Prison officials may react by using
disciplinary methods such as isolation and restraints, which can further exacerbate the
child’s difficulty in adjusting to prison life. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & ACLU, GROWING UP
LOCKED DOWN: YOUTH IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN JAILS AND PRISONS ACROSS THE UNITED
STATES 51–52 (2012).
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A final consideration relating to timing is whether Graham requires that states
provide only one opportunity for release, or whether periodic review is required.
Again, Graham is silent on this issue. Parole systems typically provide periodic
review, although the length of time between reviews differs.242 In recent years,
some states have increased the length of time between reviews in response to
complaints by victims about the trauma of repeatedly revisiting the crime.243
Periodic review is logical in terms of assessing rehabilitation, because prisoners
mature and reform at different rates, and it is difficult ex ante to predict when
someone might be ready for release. Moreover, a prisoner’s ability to demonstrate
rehabilitation may be heavily dependent on the availability of programming within
prisons. Indeed, many of the juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences were
excluded from participation in programming because they had no chance of ever
being released.244 A single review date set early means that some individuals will
not have had enough time to establish readiness for release. However, a single
review date set late likely means holding people in prison who present no risk to
the community. Finally, a single review date creates an all-or-nothing structure for
the decision maker. In close calls, the best approach may be to defer decision and to
review the case again after more information can be obtained. In some instances, a
decision maker might want to see how a prisoner progresses in a particular program
or toward a specific goal before making a decision on release.245
In sum, to provide a meaningful opportunity for release, states must provide the
opportunity for release at a meaningful time. In responding to Graham and Miller,
states have focused on this timing component of the decisions. Some states have
plainly fallen short in their responses, whereas other responses are closer to the
line. These timing questions will no doubt be the subjects of future litigation. States

242. For example, in Massachusetts, inmates serving life sentences who are denied parole
must be reconsidered at regular intervals not to exceed five years. See Frequently Asked
Questions, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/parole-board/frequently-asked
-questions.html. In New York, an inmate denied parole at the parole board interview must be
allowed to reappear within twenty-four months of the last appearance. See N.Y. State Dep’t
of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, New York State Parole Handbook, NY.GOV, https://
www.parole.ny.gov/intro_handbook.html#h2_27.
243. For example, in California prior to 2008, the parole board typically held hearings for
inmates serving life sentences on an annual basis after the initial term was served.
Proposition 9 changed the default period between hearings from one year to fifteen years,
with a minimum period of three years between hearings. See Gilman v. Schwarzenegger,
638 F.3d 1101, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2011). In Georgia, the Board of Pardons changed the
frequency of parole hearings from every three years to up to every eight years for inmates
serving life sentences. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 247 (2000).
244. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AGAINST ALL ODDS: PRISON CONDITIONS FOR YOUTH
OFFENDERS SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES IN THE UNITED STATES 26–36
(2012). In addition, regardless of any exclusion policies, some prisons have limited
rehabilitative programming and long waitlists for programs. See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld,
As Rehab Programs Are Cut, Prisons Do Less to Keep Inmates from Returning, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 17, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/17/local/me-rehab17.
245. The Model Penal Code draft recommends periodic review for both adult and
juvenile offenders. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 6.11A(h), 305.6(2) (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011).
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seeking to minimize litigation and the potential for additional resentencings should
avoid adopting sentencing schemes that deny parole for forty or fifty years. Rather,
starting periodic review at a ten- or fifteen-year mark is well within constitutional
limits, consistent with the MPC approach, and gives sufficient time for the offender
to mature and change before the initial review.
B. A Realistic Chance of Release
A second component of the meaningful opportunity requirement relates to the
likelihood that states will actually grant release, and the criteria used by authorities
in assessing release.
The actual likelihood of release bears on the severity of a sentence and is
relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis. Although the Court in Graham uses the
phrase “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” several times in the decision,246
it concludes the opinion by stating: “A State need not guarantee the offender
eventual release, but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with
some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”247 Graham
specifically rejects the view that the possibility of clemency provides an adequate
chance for release, asserting that clemency for the prisoner is a “remote possibility
. . . [that] does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”248 The Court’s decisions
in Solem and Rummel likewise reveal that the actual likelihood of release is
relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis.249 Thus, under Graham, a meaningful
opportunity for release means a realistic one.
Regarding the criteria for release, Graham requires that states “give defendants
like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.”250 Therefore, an assessment of whether the prisoner
has matured and rehabilitated must be central to the release decision. A releasing
authority that relies too heavily on the severity of the initial offense in denying
release will run afoul of the Eighth Amendment. Graham and Miller take as given
that the offense is serious. Under Graham, a realistic chance of release must be
provided even when the juvenile offender was convicted of a violent crime such as
rape or kidnapping.251 And Miller holds that the judge must have a sentencing
option that would allow a juvenile convicted of even the most heinous murder
offense the realistic chance for release.252 Under these decisions, a juvenile
offender’s chance of release thus must be tied to whether he or she has

246. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030, 2033 (2010).
247. Id. at 2034 (emphasis added).
248. Id. at 2027.
249. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–03 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
280–81 (1980).
250. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (emphasis added).
251. Id. at 2051–52 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasizing a particularly “depraved” case
to which Graham’s holding applies).
252. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2487 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that
under the Court’s holding “[e]ven a 17 1/2-year-old who sets off a bomb in a crowded mall
or guns down a dozen students and teachers is a ‘child’ and must be given a chance to
persuade a judge to permit his release into society”).
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“demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”253 The severity of the crime is taken
into account in determining the original sentence—including the date for parole
eligibility. Under Graham and Miller, crime severity should not influence an
assessment of release suitability.254
Accordingly, under Graham and Miller, rehabilitated juvenile nonhomicide
offenders must have a realistic chance of release, and judges must have the option
of imposing such a sentence on homicide offenders. For the most part, state
legislation and court decisions have not focused on fulfilling this aspect of the
Court’s mandate.255 Rather, legislatures and courts seem to assume that as long as
they make juvenile offenders eligible for parole at an appropriate time, existing
parole board practices will provide a meaningful opportunity for release. Yet,
absent specific direction, it is far from clear that parole boards will offer a realistic
chance of release. As has been described, in many states, parole board release rates
are quite low, and the nature of the offense often drives the decision.256
To ensure compliance with the Supreme Court’s mandate, states should provide
specific guidance to parole boards about assessment of juvenile offender cases. For
example, the bill considered last session by the Connecticut legislature instructs the
parole board to consider a number of factors relating to rehabilitation, including
whether “the offender has demonstrated remorse and increased maturity since the
date of the commission of the crime or crimes.”257 In addition, the board must
consider whether the individual has contributed “to the welfare of other persons
through service” and made “efforts to overcome substance abuse, addiction,
trauma, lack of education or obstacles that such person may have faced as a child or
youth in the adult correctional system.”258 Finally, the proposal specifically states
that the board should consider “the opportunities for rehabilitation in the adult
correctional system.”259 Thus, this statutory language requires the board to consider
rehabilitation-related factors, and gives a fair amount of guidance regarding the
factors relevant to assessing rehabilitation. Despite this helpful guidance, the
Connecticut proposal also instructs the board to consider whether release would
adhere to the purposes of sentencing set forth in General Statutes section
54-300(c)(1)–(4).260 Because the purposes of sentencing include an assessment of

253. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
254. David Ball asserts that current policy in California allows the parole board to
“second-guess the jury” by deeming a crime sufficiently serious “to deny suitability for
parole even when a jury did not.” Ball, supra note 151, at 971. In his view, consistent with
the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, the parole board should not “consider the commitment
offense in determining a prisoner’s suitability for parole.” Id. Similarly, under the Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the crime of conviction is taken into account in
determining a juvenile offender’s original sentence. The parole suitability question should be
based on an assessment of rehabilitation—not the nature of the original crime. See id. at 972.
255. See supra Part II.A-B.
256. See supra notes 151–66 and accompanying text.
257. H.B. 6581, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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the seriousness of the offense,261 this factor may stray too far from the criteria for
release intended by Graham.
Louisiana’s new statute also contains rehabilitation-focused factors. However,
one factor is of concern. The statute states that an individual will be eligible for
parole consideration only if he or she “has obtained a low-risk level designation
determined by a validated risk assessment instrument approved by the secretary of
the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.”262 Risk assessments under these
instruments are often tied to factors that are immutable—such as age at the time of
offense, nature of the offense, and elementary school maladjustment.263 Thus, this
requirement is likely to include consideration of factors unrelated to rehabilitation,
and reduce the chances that a rehabilitated juvenile offender will actually be
released.
It bears noting that one cannot conclude based on current parole release rates of
prisoners convicted of violent crimes whether a particular state’s parole board will
provide a rehabilitated juvenile offender with a realistic chance for release. Going
forward, data will need to be collected to determine the release rates of juvenile
offenders sentenced to long prison terms. Moreover, an analysis of the prisoner’s
degree of rehabilitation needs to be assessed to determine if parole boards are
complying with Graham, for Graham requires a realistic chance of release for
rehabilitated juvenile offenders, not for all juvenile offenders. Over time, trends in
these cases will emerge, and it may be possible for prisoners to establish that a
parole board is failing to grant release in an appropriate number of juvenile cases
involving rehabilitated prisoners.
In sum, historically, parole boards have not been required to make the
possibility of parole release realistic for inmates. Thus, simply making juvenile
offenders eligible for parole under existing practices will not guarantee compliance
with Eighth Amendment requirements. To help ensure a realistic chance of release
for rehabilitated juvenile offenders, state legislatures and courts should craft special
criteria for parole boards to consider in assessing the suitability of these prisoners
for release. Looking forward, parole boards should know that their decisions with
respect to juvenile offenders will be subject to increased scrutiny by courts.

261. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-300(c) (West Supp. 2013) (“[S]entencing should
reflect the seriousness of the offense and be proportional to the harm to victims and the
community.”).
262. LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 15:574.4 (Supp. 2013).
263. See, e.g., Barbara E. McDermott, John F. Edens, Cameron D. Quanbeck, David
Busse & Charles L. Scott, Examining the Role of Static and Dynamic Risk Factors in the
Prediction of Inpatient Violence: Variable- and Person-Focused Analyses, 32 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 325, 326 (2008). For an interesting discussion regarding risk assessment by parole
boards, see W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
395, 397–40 (2011). Ball asserts that parole boards fail to engage in an accurate cost-benefit
analysis when making release determinations because they consider only the risk of release,
and not its benefit. Id. at 400–03.

2014]

REVIEW FOR RELEASE

415

C. Meaningful Hearings
The third component of the meaningful opportunity requirement relates to the
procedures employed by the releasing authority in making a release decision.
Below, this procedural aspect of Graham is explored.
1. The Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and Parole Release
Hearings
The Court in Graham explicitly declined to tie its holding to a requirement that
states make nonhomicide juvenile offenders eligible for parole.264 Rather, likely
because of the wide variation in parole practices in states around the country, the
Court instead employed the phrase “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”265
Although the Court did not elaborate further on the meaning of this phrase, it is
clear that a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” must encompass the concept
that states provide meaningful consideration of a prisoner’s suitability for release.
Otherwise, one cannot be confident that an inmate’s maturity and rehabilitation
have been accurately assessed. Thus, a state’s existing parole system will comply
with the Eighth Amendment only if it actually uses a meaningful process for
considering release. In other words, the parole board must provide more than pro
forma consideration. In addition, Graham’s meaningful opportunity mandate leaves
room for states to use release mechanisms other than parole to comply with the
decision.
Thus, although Graham is typically viewed as a case that places substantive
limits on punishment, it is also a case about procedure. Richard Bierschbach is one
of the few scholars to consider the procedural aspect of the Graham decision.266 He
explains that Graham allows “the most severe form of punishment for juvenile
offenders—life in prison—[to be] imposed, but only if it is accompanied by the
procedural protection of parole.”267 “Parole thus conceptually severs Graham from
Roper, Atkins, and other classic proportionality cases on which it relied for much of

264. Instead, the Court requires states to provide prisoners with a “meaningful
opportunity to obtain release” and provides that “[i]t is for the State, in the first instance, to
explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.” Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,
2030 (2010).
265. Id. at 2016.
266. See Bierschbach, supra note 12, at 1748. Professor Bierschbach argues that Graham
should be understood not only as a substantive limit on punishment, but as establishing a rule
of constitutional criminal procedure, “one that links the validity of punishment to the
institutional structure of sentencing.” Id. In particular, “[b]y requiring the State to revisit its
first-order sentencing judgments at a later point in time, Graham mandates a procedural
space for granular, textured, and ultimately more reliable sentencing determinations.” Id.;
see also Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 12, at 398–400 (arguing that most commentators
have missed the “procedural nuances” of Graham and Miller, and these cases—like
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)—are part of a “larger structural and procedural
framework for constitutionally tailoring punishment”).
267. Bierschbach, supra note 12, at 1766.
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its doctrinal support. Despite their obvious similarities, none of those cases linked
the constitutionality of punishment to a procedural rule.”268
There are several possible frameworks for considering the process required by
Graham. First, Graham could be viewed as creating a right to a hearing with
procedural protections that stem from the Eighth Amendment. The Court
recognized in Graham that the possibility of release bears on an assessment of the
severity of the sentence, and a sentence without a meaningful chance of release is
unduly severe for nonhomicide juvenile offenders.269 Thus, as a substantive matter
under the Eighth Amendment, the sentence must allow a meaningful and realistic
chance for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. To satisfy
this right to the chance of release, states must provide meaningful consideration of
the individual circumstances of the prisoner. In this way, the procedural rights
needed to ensure meaningful consideration of a prisoner for release can be viewed
as originating from the Eighth Amendment.
Prior cases have recognized that certain procedural rights flow from the Eighth
Amendment. Bierschbach observes that the “interaction of substance and procedure
that drives the constitutional significance of parole” makes Graham resemble the
Court’s decisions in Woodson v. North Carolina and Lockett v. Ohio.270 In
Woodson v. North Carolina,271 the Court held that a mandatory death penalty
statute violates the Eighth Amendment because it does not allow “particularized
consideration” of the circumstances of the case.272 Similarly, in Lockett v. Ohio,273
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment requires states in death penalty cases to
allow broad consideration of any mitigating factors regarding the offense or
offender.274 These cases have emphasized the need for enhanced procedural
protections to ensure that reliable judgments are made about whether to impose the
uniquely severe penalty of death.275
Although scholars have described Woodson and Lockett as requiring “super due
process” in the capital context,276 the cases invoke the Eighth Amendment rather

268. Id. at 1766–67 (footnote omitted).
269. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027–30.
270. Bierschbach, supra note 12, at 1749.
271. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
272. Id. at 303. The dissent in Woodson accused the plurality opinion of “import[ing] into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment what it conceives to be desirable
procedural guarantees where the punishment of death, concededly not cruel and unusual for
the crime of which the defendant was convicted, is to be imposed.” Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
273. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
274. Id. at 604.
275. Id. at 604–05; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (noting the qualitative difference between
death and life imprisonment and the “corresponding difference in the need for reliability in
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case”).
276. Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due
Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980); see also Robert M. Cover, Violence and
the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1622 n.22 (1986); Elizabeth Rapaport, A Modest Proposal:
The Aged of Death Row Should Be Deemed Too Old to Execute, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1089,
1114–15 (2012).
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than procedural due process analysis as the basis for the holdings.277 Miller relies
on Woodson and Lockett in prohibiting mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders,
and itself encompasses a procedural holding grounded in the Eighth Amendment.278
Indeed, Miller shows the Court’s willingness to find that Eighth Amendment
procedural rights attach outside of the capital context. Although a parole hearing
does not determine if a juvenile offender will live or die, its outcome is of profound
significance to the prisoner: denial of parole means the prisoner will die in prison.
Thus, drawing upon the Court’s prior jurisprudence, one could view the Eighth
Amendment as requiring certain procedural protections at parole hearings to ensure
that boards give meaningful consideration to the release decision and make reliable
judgments.
Alternatively, one could view Graham instead as triggering procedural due
process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment for juvenile offenders at
parole hearings. As discussed, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Greenholtz,
minimal due process protections do not attach to parole release hearings unless
state statutes create a liberty interest in release, and many states have chosen to
avoid constitutional constraints by creating purely discretionary parole regimes.279
Graham’s Eighth Amendment requirement that states provide a “meaningful” and
“realistic” chance of release could be seen as creating a liberty interest for juvenile
offenders in release—regardless of whether applicable state statutes have otherwise
created such an interest. After Graham, release decisions for juvenile offenders
serving life sentences are no longer purely discretionary for states. Rather,
prisoners have a certain entitlement: although they are not guaranteed release, they
are entitled to a realistic chance of release if they demonstrate maturity and
rehabilitation. This entitlement could be viewed as creating a liberty interest. Under
this framework, one would apply traditional procedural due process analysis to
determine what procedures Graham requires. Indeed, although the Supreme Court
had not used the phrase “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” prior to
Graham, the Court has frequently used the term “meaningful opportunity” in
reference to procedural due process requirements.280

277. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. Other cases rely on the
Eighth Amendment to find that enhanced procedures apply in capital cases. See, e.g., Mills
v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) (recognizing the right to the benefit of nonunanimous jury
decision on mitigating circumstances in capital cases). Bierschbach references Woodson and
Lockett, explaining that “Graham is not the first time the Court has hinged the
constitutionality of a punishment on this type of procedural rule.” Bierschbach, supra note
12, at 1767.
278. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012) (“That correspondence—Graham’s
‘[t]reat[ment] [of] juvenile life sentences as analogous to capital punishment,’—makes
relevant here a second line of our precedents, demanding individualized sentencing when
imposing the death penalty.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2038–39 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment))).
279. See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
280. The most common use of the phrase is in reference to a “meaningful opportunity to
be heard.” See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) (stating that due process
requires “a meaningful opportunity to be heard”). The Court has used the term “meaningful
opportunity” in reference to due process requirements in other contexts as well. See, e.g.,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that due process required that a
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Somewhat analogous to Graham are the Court’s decisions addressing the
procedures required for sanity and clemency hearings of death-sentenced prisoners,
which have applied due process analysis. In Ford v. Wainwright,281 the Supreme
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a state from inflicting the death
penalty upon a prisoner who is insane, and concluded that Florida’s procedures for
determining the sanity of a death row prisoner had been inadequate. In detailing the
procedures required for sanity hearings, the Ford plurality drew upon both procedural
due process cases and Eighth Amendment precedent such as Woodson.282 However,
Justice Powell’s concurrence, which controls, analyzed the matter explicitly under the
due process clause.283 In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard,284 the Court
considered whether death-sentenced inmates are entitled to any procedural
protections in clemency determinations. A plurality of the Court held that they were
not.285 However, a concurring opinion by Justice O’Connor concluded that certain
minimal due process protections attach to clemency proceedings because a prisoner
under a sentence of death has a continuing interest in life.286 Thus, relying on Ford
and Woodard, courts might use procedural due process analysis in considering the
scope of Graham’s mandate.
In sum, Graham plainly has a procedural component—states must provide
meaningful consideration of a prisoner’s suitability for release. Less immediately
apparent is how courts will analyze Graham’s procedural requirements when faced
with claims from prisoners alleging that they were denied meaningful hearings under
state parole rules. Courts might use an Eighth Amendment framework for considering
such claims, or they could turn to traditional procedural due process analysis.
Considering the Eighth Amendment as the source of procedural rights for release
hearings could lead to a more robust view of those rights. Eighth Amendment
procedural rules, as they have developed in the capital context, are focused on the
importance of reliable judgments and on the need for individual consideration of the
offense and offender. Courts often find heightened protections attach given the
severity of the punishment at issue.287
In contrast, under a procedural due process approach, courts will likely start by
looking at existing due process requirements for parole hearings. Historically, even
where a state statute has created a liberty interest, courts have required only very
U.S. citizen being held as enemy combatant be given a “meaningful opportunity” to contest
factual basis for his detention); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (stating that
due process entitles a defendant to “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense”) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
281. 477 U.S. 399, 410, 417–18 (1986) (plurality opinion).
282. Id. at 411–14.
283. Id. at 424 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (“[Under Ford,] [o]nce a prisoner seeking a stay
of execution has made ‘a substantial threshold showing of insanity,’ the protection afforded
by procedural due process includes a ‘fair hearing’ in accord with fundamental fairness.”
(quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 426, 424 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment))).
284. 523 U.S. 272 (1998) (plurality opinion).
285. Id. at 288.
286. Id. at 288–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
287. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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minimal process for parole release decisions. For example, in Greenholtz, the
Supreme Court found that Nebraska’s informal hearing process provided adequate
process, and a formal evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.288 In addition, the Court
refused to require the parole board to provide a written statement of the evidence
relied upon in reaching a decision and instead found that a simple communication of
reasons for the parole denial sufficed.289 More recently, in Swarthout v. Cooke,290 the
Court held that due process was satisfied when California lifers “were allowed to
speak at their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them, were afforded
access to their records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole was
denied.”291 Cooke reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that due process requires
“some evidence” supporting the parole board’s decision denying release.292
Courts considering the process required by Graham might distinguish these prior
parole cases and find that more process is due to juvenile offenders serving life
sentences. As discussed further below, this category of prisoners faces unique
challenges in presenting an effective case for release, and the interest at stake—
whether one will be released before death—is serious. Nevertheless, if courts use due
process analysis, it may be an uphill battle for juvenile offenders to secure greater
procedural protections than those required for adult offenders in jurisdictions where
due process protections attach.
In any event, regardless of whether one views release hearing procedures as
governed by Eighth Amendment or procedural due process analysis, the core
requirement of Graham is that parole boards give juvenile offenders meaningful
hearings. As discussed below, there are several aspects of current parole practices in
many states that threaten to deny juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. Before discussing these problematic parole practices, I explore the special
challenges facing juvenile offenders seeking release.
2. The Challenges of Presenting a Case for Release
An assessment of the procedures necessary to ensure meaningful hearings for
juvenile offenders requires consideration of the special challenges facing juvenile
offenders in seeking release.
Presenting a persuasive case for release is a difficult endeavor, especially for a
prisoner convicted of a violent offense. Juvenile offenders serving lengthy sentences
will tend to face particular obstacles in presenting an effective case for release. The
first challenge is that many will lack the self-confidence, education, and
organizational skills required to make a persuasive presentation. Some of these
individuals have been incarcerated since they were thirteen or fourteen years old and
thus grew up in prison.293 Many had limited education prior to incarceration294 and

288. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1979).
289. Id. at 15–16.
290. 131 S. Ct. 859 (2011).
291. Id. at 862.
292. Id. at 862–63.
293. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAROLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 4 (2007).
294. See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS:
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have not had opportunities within prison to develop critical skills.295 Some were
victims of trauma and abuse before their arrests296 and have been further victimized
in prison.297 Some suffer from depression or other mental illnesses.298
A second challenge is the prisoner’s access to relevant mitigating information.
An individual may not have a clear memory of his or her childhood, particularly if
it was marked by exposure to stress and trauma.299 Some information—such as the
prisoner’s prenatal exposure to drugs—may not be known at all by the prisoner.
The individual, having grown up in prison, may have lost ties to family members or
others who could help supply relevant details. In addition, an individual may not
accurately remember the crime itself, especially if mental illness or drug use was
involved. Extensive investigation of a person’s background is necessary to present
an accurate picture to the releasing authority, and usually an evaluation by a mental
health expert will be required.300 A psychiatrist or psychologist could provide
insight about the ways in which the inmate’s youth or mental illness may have
contributed to the crime, could speak to how an inmate has changed over the years,
and could assess the degree of risk he or she currently presents to the
community.301 Yet a prisoner detained since childhood cannot be expected to

FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 3 (2012), available at http://www.sentencingproject
.org/doc/publications/jj_The_Lives_of_Juvenile_Lifers.pdf (surveying juvenile lifers and
finding that two in five had been enrolled in special education classes prior to incarceration,
only 46.6% had been attending school at the time of their offense, and 84.4% had been
suspended or expelled from school at some point in time).
295. Id. at 4 (finding that 61.9% of juvenile lifers are not engaged in programming in
prison—32.7% had been denied because they will never be released from prison and an
additional 28.9% were in prisons without sufficient programming or had completed all
available programming).
296. Id. at 10 (finding that 79% of juvenile lifers witnessed violence at home or in foster
care or group homes; 46.9% experienced physical abuse; one in five juvenile lifers was
sexually abused, with 77.3% of girls reporting being sexually abused).
297. See id. at 19 (“Teenagers face a heightened risk of suicide, sexual assault and
physical assault when housed in adult prisons.”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 219, at
190 (2012) (finding that children “are much more likely to commit suicide in an adult jail
than in a juvenile facility” and “five times as likely to be sexually abused or raped as they
would be in a juvenile facility”).
298. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WHEN I DIE, THEY’LL SEND ME HOME”: YOUTH
SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA 39 (2008).
299. J. Douglas Bremner, John H. Krystal, Steven M. Southwick & Dennis S. Charney,
Functional Neuroanatomical Correlates of the Effects of Stress on Memory, 8 J. TRAUMATIC
STRESS 527, 528 (1995); J. Douglas Bremner & Meena Narayan, The Effects of Stress on
Memory and the Hippocampus Throughout the Life Cycle: Implications for Childhood
Development and Aging, 10 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 871, 873 (1998); Gary W. Evans &
Michelle A. Schamberg, Childhood Poverty, Chronic Stress, and Adult Working Memory,
106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIENCES 6545, 6546 (2009).
300. In the capital context, advocates have recognized the importance of presenting
mental health evaluations that are informed by an extensive investigation of the client’s life
history. See Richard G. Dudley, Jr. & Pamela Blume Leonard, Getting It Right: Life History
Investigation as the Foundation for a Reliable Mental Health Assessment, 36 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 963, 966–74 (2008).
301. Id. at 974–76.

2014]

REVIEW FOR RELEASE

421

muster the resources for a thorough investigation and mental health evaluation on
his or her own.
A third challenge in presenting the case for release is articulating multiple, and
at times conflicting, narratives to the decision maker. On the one hand, the decision
maker will want to hear that the prisoner acknowledges the seriousness of the
offense, takes full responsibility for it, and feels genuine remorse.302 On the other
hand, mitigating circumstances regarding the offense are highly relevant to an
assessment of the seriousness of the crime, and the decision maker needs to be
persuaded that the prisoner has rehabilitated.303 But it is difficult for someone to
focus on remorse for a terrible act while at the same time cataloging one’s
accomplishments. And it is extremely hard for a person to express remorse and take
responsibility for the crime at the same time as he or she suggests mitigation
regarding an offense. Yet in many cases involving those convicted as juveniles it
will be particularly important to present mitigating evidence regarding the offense
itself, as the offense will often involve circumstances demonstrating the juvenile’s
reduced culpability.
A final challenge is that juvenile offenders who have been detained for many
years are typically isolated, and many will lack connections and support from the
community. This isolation makes it more difficult for them to present a solid
release plan to the decision maker, and it means that they are less likely to have
individuals in the community advocate for their release.304 Parole boards need to be
persuaded that the juvenile offender—who has never lived in the community as an
adult—will be able to successfully reintegrate into society. A release plan that
shows who will support an individual upon his release, where he will live, and how
he will find employment can be quite persuasive. Failure to provide such a plan
may be fatal to the effort to obtain release.
3. Parole Release Procedures and Meaningful Hearings
As discussed below, the survey of parole board procedures reveals several areas
of concern about existing practices. In particular, many states deny prisoners the
chance to present the case for release in person before the decision maker and
prevent prisoners from seeing and rebutting key information relied upon by the
decision maker.305 Moreover, many states place strict limits on the role that a
prisoner’s counsel can play in the process.306 Given the special challenges facing
juvenile offenders in presenting an effective case for release, these procedures
threaten to deny meaningful hearings for these prisoners.

302. Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to
Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 512–26 (2008) (discussing the role of
remorse at parole hearings).
303. See id. at 511–12 (examining the factors considered by parole boards in assessing a
prisoner’s suitability for release).
304. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 244, at 41 (describing the isolation of
juveniles serving LWOP sentences).
305. See supra notes 176–87, 211–13 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 188–95 and accompanying text.
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a. In-Person Hearing Before Decision Makers
The survey of parole boards shows that many states do not allow the prisoner to
appear in person before the decision maker.307 In several states, parole decisions are
made based on “file review,” and there is no interaction at all between the prisoner
and the board.308 In other states, the person who interacts with the prisoner is an
employee of the parole board, and not someone with decision-making power.309 At
hearings in some of these states, the prisoner is absent and the decision makers
interact directly with other key players—including the victim and prosecutor.310 In
other instances, the decision maker interacts with the prisoner, but does so via
videoconference or telephone.311
Historically, where no liberty interest is created by state statute, states have been
free to deny in-person parole hearings to prisoners. In states where a liberty interest
exists, case law does not establish whether due process requires an in-person
hearing for adult offenders—as the systems upheld by the Supreme Court in Cooke
and Greenholtz both allowed inmates to appear in person.312 But regardless of the
law governing hearings for adult offenders, a strong argument can be made that
states should allow juvenile offenders to appear in person before decision makers to
ensure compliance with Graham’s meaningful opportunity requirement.313

307. See supra notes 176–87 and accompanying text.
308. Alabama and North Carolina.
309. See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
312. Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (per curiam) (stating inmates were
“allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them”);
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (stating
inmate was “permitted to appear before the Board and present letters and statements on his
own behalf”). Prior to Greenholtz, the Second Circuit rejected a due process challenge to the
New York system that denied in-person hearings before the decision makers. Zurak v.
Regan, 550 F.2d 86, 96 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Although a personal interview might provide the
inmate with a better opportunity to present his case to the Board, we think that, under all the
circumstances, the inmate has sufficient opportunity to present the relevant facts through the
parole officer and by his own submission of any information helpful to his cause.”).
Lower courts have generally rejected due process challenges to the use of
videoconferencing at parole release and revocation hearings. See, e.g., Wilkins v.
Timmerman-Cooper, 512 F.3d 768, 776 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding no due process violation
where videoconferencing technology used for witness testimony at parole revocation
proceeding); Pappas v. Ky. Parole Bd., 156 S.W.3d 303, 306 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (finding
that videoconferencing in a parole release hearing does not violate due process). In some
jurisdictions, courts have found that in-person parole release hearings are statutorily
required. See Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d 442, 454–55 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that
federal statute requires prisoners to be physically present at federal parole hearings, and
videoconferencing does not suffice).
313. Allowing a prisoner to appear before the decision maker has an added benefit: it
fosters a sense of legitimacy in the system. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
3–7 (1990) (arguing procedural justice is a central component of how individuals make
judgments about the legitimacy of authorities). If prisoners feel release decisions will be
fairly assessed, they are more likely to comply with prison rules and work toward obtaining
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The Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he opportunity to be heard must be
tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard,”314 and
written submissions are an “unrealistic option” for individuals “who lack the
educational attainment necessary to write effectively.”315 In addition,
written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations;
they do not permit the recipient to mold his argument to the issues the
decision maker appears to regard as important. Particularly where
credibility and veracity are at issue . . . written submissions are a
wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision.316
The Court has recognized similar deficiencies with second-hand presentations of
information to decision makers.317
These concerns are certainly present with respect to parole hearings for juvenile
offenders. As outlined above, juvenile offenders face unique challenges in seeking
release at parole hearings. Denial of an in-person hearing is particularly
problematic for juvenile offenders since prisoners detained since childhood will
often “lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively,”318 and are
likely to be much more capable of expressing themselves orally. In addition, under
Graham, the parole board must determine the extent of a juvenile offender’s
rehabilitation. Assessing the character and credibility of the prisoner is central to
determining if he or she has truly rehabilitated. A written submission by the
prisoner, or a second-hand summary from a third party, simply cannot convey the
same amount of information as a direct interaction.
A telephone or videoconference hearing does allow direct interaction between
the prisoner and decision maker, but it does not permit the same level of interaction
as an in-person hearing. Indeed, in the immigration context, scholars have found
that the use of videoconferencing for an asylum hearing reduces the chance that an
applicant will be granted relief.319 Given the challenges that juvenile offenders may
face in expressing themselves, and Graham’s mandate that release decisions focus

rehabilitation. See Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social
Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173,
217–22 (2008) (noting that a person’s views regarding the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system influence the likelihood that he or she will comply with the law).
314. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1970).
315. Id. at 269.
316. Id.; see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 697 (1979) (“[W]ritten
submissions are a particularly inappropriate way to distinguish a genuine hard luck story
from a fabricated tall tale.”).
317. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269.
318. Id.
319. Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Effective Processing or Assembly-Line
Justice? The Use of Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
259, 271 (2008) (finding that videoconferencing roughly doubles the chances that an asylum
applicant will be denied relief). The authors argue that videoconferencing “changes the
‘adjudicative quality’ of the Immigration Judge’s decision by fundamentally altering the
perception of the testimony.” Id. at 266. Among other problems, use of videoconferencing
prevents eye contact between the applicant and the decision maker, and undermines the
ability of the applicant to build an emotional connection with the judge. See id. at 268–69.
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on assessing rehabilitation, telephone or videoconference hearings may not provide
a meaningful hearing.
b. Access to Information
The survey establishes that a majority of states do not give prisoners the right to
see significant information relied upon by the decision maker.320 Although some
jurisdictions ensure full access to information provided by the prosecutor and
victim, other states prevent prisoners from seeing some or all of this information.321
In addition, many states prevent prisoners from seeing the conclusions and
recommendations of mental health professionals who examined them for the
board.322
The ability to see and rebut information relied upon by a decision maker is a
crucial part of ensuring a fair hearing.323 Without knowledge of the information
relied upon by the parole board, the prisoner cannot dispute its accuracy or provide
an alternative account. A bar on information provided by the victim and prosecutor
prevents the prisoner from rebutting descriptions of the crime or other adverse
information that may be crucially important to the decision maker. Moreover,
mental health evaluations could contain erroneous information that has a major
influence on the release decision. Finally, virtually all boards rely on summaries of
information regarding the prisoner compiled for the hearing by either department of
correction or board employees.324 This information too might contain inaccuracies.
Giving prisoners access to the information on which the decision makers rely is an
important component of ensuring a meaningful hearing.325

320. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
323. In other contexts, courts have held that due process requires the chance to rebut
adverse information. See, e.g., Brock v. Roadway Express., Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 264 (1987)
(“We conclude that minimum due process for the employer in this context requires notice of
the employee’s allegations, notice of the substance of the relevant supporting evidence, an
opportunity to submit a written response, and an opportunity to meet with the investigator
and present statements from rebuttal witnesses.”); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489
(1972) (stating that due process requires “disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him”
at revocation proceeding and the chance to confront witnesses).
324. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
325. Parole boards may try to justify the lack of disclosure on safety grounds. However,
some jurisdictions do allow inmate access to victim and prosecutor information, and thus
apparently have not found these concerns to trump the other interests at stake. Victims and
prosecutors can choose not to disclose information to the board that they do not want shared
with the inmate.
In states where due process protections attach to parole release hearings, courts are
split on whether access to institutional files is required. See Walker v. Prisoner Review Bd.,
694 F.2d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1982) (collecting cases and stating that the relevant inquiry
should be whether “the combination of procedures available to the parole candidate is
sufficient to minimize the risk that a decision will be based on incorrect information”).
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c. Role of Counsel
The survey demonstrates that some states do not allow attorneys for prisoners to
have a meaningful role in the parole release process. For example, six states do not
consider attorney input at all in making a release decision,326 and fourteen states do
not permit an attorney to be present for the inmate’s interview or hearing.327 Only
ten states responding to the survey appoint counsel for indigent prisoners in any
cases at all,328 and two of these states restrict appointment of counsel to instances
where the inmate cannot understand the proceedings.329 Even if counsel is
provided, the funding may be extremely limited. For example, in California,
attorneys appointed for “lifer” hearings are paid a maximum of $400 for a case.330
The role of counsel at ordinary parole release hearings is not surprising, given
existing due process jurisprudence. The due process clause requires the
appointment of counsel in only a narrow range of cases.331 Even when courts have
found that due process rights attach to parole release hearings, they have not
required appointment of counsel.332 Moreover, courts have rejected due process
challenges to restrictions on the involvement of even retained counsel at parole
release hearings.333
Appointing counsel for indigent juvenile offenders would go a long way toward
ensuring a meaningful hearing for juvenile offenders. As discussed above, juvenile
offenders often lack skills essential to presenting an effective case for release.334
Given their confinement and lack of resources, these prisoners cannot undertake the
extensive investigation of their backgrounds and offenses that is the basis for a
persuasive presentation. Counsel could undertake this investigation and also retain

326. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
329. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
330. Katera Estrada Rutledge, Successful Parole Consideration Hearings: The Basic
Handbook for the Life Prisoner, RUTLEDGE & RUTLEDGE (April 2012),
http://www.rutledgeattorneys.com/pages/content/13044.
331. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 (2011).
332. Currie v. Hill, No. C 11–6315 PJH (PR), 2012 WL 5340930, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25,
2012) (finding no due process right to counsel for California parole release hearing).
333. In Holup v. Gates, 544 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit upheld the Connecticut
Parole Board’s restriction on the involvement of counsel. The court reasoned:
The justification advanced by the Board for excluding counsel or counsel-substitute
from the hearing itself is quite reasonable: The purpose of the hearing in the
Connecticut system is to enable the members personally to speak with and observe
the inmate, to determine his attitude towards his crime, readiness for parole and the
like. The members feel that this can best be achieved by hearing the inmate’s own
words, unguided by the presence or promptings of counsel. We find that the state’s
interest in excluding persons other than the inmate from the hearings outweighs the
“need for and usefulness” to the inmate of having such a representative, despite the
inmate’s concededly great interest in the decision being made.
Id. at 84.
334. See supra notes 240–45 and accompanying text.
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a mental health expert in appropriate cases.335 In addition, counsel could help a
prisoner navigate the difficulty one encounters in simultaneously expressing
remorse and mitigation. Given the severity of the crimes, it will be necessary at
hearings to confront the circumstance of the offense and explain how the inmate’s
youth and other factors at the time of the crime mitigate culpability. Counsel could
focus on these issues, while the inmate can express remorse and the desire to atone.
Some parole boards take the view that counsel interferes with the board’s ability
to connect directly with the prisoner and assess whether he or she is genuinely
committed to change.336 Certainly, it is important for the prisoner to speak directly
to the decision maker. A decision maker needs to be persuaded by the prisoner that
he or she is truly remorseful and reformed.337 But the presence of counsel need not
interfere with the client’s direct communication with the board. Counsel could play
an important role in investigating, collecting, and presenting factual information so
that the release decision is based on a full presentation of the relevant evidence.
The prisoner could focus on a personal statement for the board.338
The bill considered in Connecticut during the last legislative session provides a
possible model regarding the appointment of counsel in juvenile cases.339 Under the
proposal, the parole board would appoint counsel for indigent juvenile offenders
twelve months prior to the parole release hearing.340 Appointed counsel would then

335. See Beth Caldwell, Appealing to Empathy: Counsel’s Obligation to Present Mitigating
Evidence for Juveniles in Adult Court, 64 ME. L. REV. 391, 397–410 (2012) (discussing the
mitigating circumstances present in many juvenile offender cases and counsel’s role in collecting
this evidence).
336. Holup, 544 F.2d at 84.
337. There are, of course, dangers in making decisions based on an assessment of remorse.
See Martha Grace Duncan, “So Young and So Untender”: Remorseless Children and the
Expectations of the Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1469, 1520 (2002) (challenging the notion
that judges can truly interpret the emotional state of juvenile offenders and questioning “the
validity of remorse as a predictor of future character”).
338. Rhode Island recognizes the separate roles that counsel and the inmate can play and
the ways in which these roles can complement each other. The Parole Board’s website states:
Inmates do not need to be represented at the initial parole hearing or at any
reconsideration hearing. Many inmates do choose to have legal representation
when they are uncomfortable speaking on their own behalf. Others choose to
have legal representation because they believe that there are mitigating
circumstances that an attorney could better explain to the Parole Board. Be
advised that even if the inmate is represented by an attorney, the inmate will
still have to answer questions from the Parole Board. While the Parole Board
does allow attorneys to be present at hearings, the Board does not allow
attorneys to speak for the inmate. The Parole Board wants to weigh the
inmate’s insight and level of remorse and they will only be able to do so by
hearing directly from the inmate. Having an attorney present does not provide
the inmate with a better chance of getting a positive parole decision.
State of R.I. Parole Bd. & Sex Offender Cmty. Notification Unit, Frequently Asked
Questions, RI.GOV, http://www.paroleboard.ri.gov/faq/.
339. H.B. 6581, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2013).
340. Id. § 1(f)(3). A limitation in the Connecticut proposal is that it would allow the
Board of Pardons and Paroles to continue its existing (and longstanding) practice of
preventing counsel from speaking at the parole release hearing. See id. (allowing the
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have sufficient time to investigate and develop mitigating evidence, retain a mental
health expert, and assist the inmate in preparing a release plan.
In sum, existing parole board restrictions on the role of the prisoner’s counsel
are problematic. Boards should rethink their policies on attorney involvement in
order to ensure meaningful hearings for juvenile offenders.
d. Notice, Recording, Statement of Reasons for Decision, and Review
In addition to the procedures discussed above, several other procedures are
important to ensuring meaningful hearings. First, releasing authorities should
provide adequate notice to prisoners of the date of a hearing so that prisoners and
their attorneys can adequately prepare.341 Second, to enable review of the decision,
parole boards should record hearings and provide a statement of reasons for the
decision.342 Notice, recording, and a statement of reasons are core requirements of a
meaningful hearing recognized by courts in many other contexts.343 Indeed, notice
of parole hearings is already required in many jurisdictions, and some parole boards
currently record hearings and provide statements of reasons.344
Providing a mechanism for direct review of parole board decisions involving
juvenile offenders would help ensure that these prisoners receive a meaningful
opportunity for release. Allowing appellate review of a parole board’s finding of
unsuitability is critical to enforcing Graham’s meaningful opportunity requirement
because it would allow reversal of decisions that were not made in a meaningful or
accurate manner. In addition, allowing appellate review would promote greater
consistency in decisions by the board and would help foster development and
offender to speak but limiting counsel to submitting reports and other documents); see also
Holup, 544 F.2d at 84–85 (upholding Connecticut’s practice of preventing counsel from
participating at parole hearings).
341. Notice was provided in Cooke and Greenholtz and thus was not explicitly at issue in
those cases. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (per curiam); Greenholtz v.
Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979). The Court’s decision in
Cooke implies that notice is required if due process protections attach. See Cooke, 131 S. Ct.
at 862.
342. As with the issue of notice, a statement of reasons was provided in Cooke and
Greenholtz. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 862; Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 5. Again, the Court’s decision
in Cooke implies that a statement of reasons is required if due process protections attach. See
Cooke, 131 S. Ct. at 862.
343. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 271 (1970) (requiring “timely and
adequate notice” and for the decision maker to “state the reasons for his determination and
indicate the evidence he relied on”).
344. For example, Massachusetts issues written parole release decisions for “lifer
hearings”—those involving inmates sentenced to life with the chance of parole for seconddegree murder. Notice is provided prior to hearings, and they are recorded by audio and
videotape. Second Degree Lifer Parole Hearing Process, supra note 136. In California,
notice is provided for “lifer hearings” and written transcripts of hearings are available. CAL.
DEP’T OF CORR. & REHABILITATION, PAROLE SUITABILITY HEARING HANDBOOK 11 (2010),
available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Victim_Services/docs/BPHHandbook.pdf. In its postGraham legislation, Louisiana enacted a requirement that the panel deciding whether to
release a juvenile offender “render specific findings of fact in support of its decision.”
LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 15:574.4(d)(3) (West Supp. 2013).
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refinement of the meaningful opportunity requirement. Indeed, appellate review
can be viewed as an essential ingredient of Graham’s meaningful opportunity
requirement itself. Part of what makes a process meaningful is the ability to force
decision makers to justify their decisions and to be able to challenge these decisions
before another body.345
1. Other Procedural Models
As discussed, existing parole procedures in many states may fail to ensure
meaningful hearings for juvenile offenders. As states look to modify existing
practices to comply with Graham and Miller, they may draw upon procedures used
for different types of hearings. Below, several possible procedural models are
considered.
a. Parole Revocation Hearings
Some of the procedures already used by parole boards at parole revocation
hearings provide a possible model for states to use for Graham hearings. In
Morrissey v. Brewer,346 the Supreme Court held that minimal due process rights
attach to a decision to revoke parole. The Court required:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to
the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers
or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.347
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,348 the Court applied the same standards with respect to
probation revocation proceedings. The Court in Gagnon also found that a parolee
or probationer facing revocation has a qualified right to appointed counsel.349

345. Even absent a statutory right to appeal the parole decision, prisoners denied parole
could assert in court that their sentences violate the Eighth Amendment because they were
not provided a meaningful opportunity for release. However, a statutory right to appeal is
preferable for the reasons described, and given the procedural and jurisdictional hurdles that
prisoners may encounter in attempting to bring such an Eighth Amendment challenge.
346. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
347. Id. at 489.
348. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
349. Id. at 790. The right attaches if there is a substantial issue regarding whether the
alleged violation occurred or, even if it is clear that the violation occurred, there are
“substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation
inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.”
Id.
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Thus, because of these due process requirements, parole boards already have
procedures in place for appointment of counsel for at least some revocation
proceedings. In addition, boards must have procedures regarding written notice of
revocation hearings, disclosure of evidence to parolees, testimony of witnesses at
hearings, and written statements of reasons for decisions. Applying some of these
same procedural protections to parole release hearings for juvenile offenders would
be a relatively straightforward task.
b. Psychiatric Review Boards
Psychiatric review boards provide another possible procedural model for release
hearings for juvenile offenders. These boards periodically review patients detained
pursuant to findings of not guilty by reason of insanity to determine if they can be
released without causing danger to the community.350 As with hearings under
Graham, the hearings by the psychiatric review board consider whether someone
should be released from confinement—usually after a lengthy period of time. At
issue at both types of hearings is whether someone has changed since the time of an
offense and can be safely released. Moreover, like the psychiatric review hearings,
juvenile offender hearings will often involve the consideration of mental health
information.
States use a variety of procedures to review the suitability for release of those
found not guilty by reason of insanity. For example, in Connecticut, detailed
statutory provisions govern the procedures of the Psychiatric Security Review
Board. The person responsible for psychiatric care for the patient must submit a
report to the board every six months, and the board must hold a hearing to review
the suitability of patients for discharge at least every two years.351 The patient has
the right to appear at all proceedings before the board and, if indigent, to have
counsel appointed.352 Prior to a hearing, “the board, acquittee and state’s attorney
may each choose a psychiatrist or psychologist to examine the acquittee.”353 The
acquittee and state’s attorney have the right to examine any documents considered
by the board.354 The hearing must be open to the public,355 a record must be kept,356
and an order of the board may be appealed to the court.357
Substantially more procedural protections attach to psychiatric review hearings
than to parole release hearings, despite some of the similarities between these types

350. Carolyn Alexander, Oregon’s Psychiatric Security Review Board: Trouble in
Paradise, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 9–13 (1998); Deborah C. Scott, Howard V. Zonana &
Marjorie A. Getz, Monitoring Insanity Acquittees: Connecticut’s Psychiatric Security
Review Board, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 980, 981–82 (1990).
351. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-585 to -586 (West 2006).
352. Id. § 17a-596(d) (West Supp. 2013).
353. Id. § 17a-596(a).
354. Id. § 17a-596(d).
355. Id.
356. Id. § 17a-596(g).
357. Id. § 17a-597 (West 2006).

430

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:373

of proceedings.358 States can look to the procedures utilized at psychiatric hearings
as a possible model for Graham compliance.
c. Court-Based Models
Although most states thus far have focused on making juvenile offenders
eligible for parole as the means for compliance with Graham and Miller, the
meaningful opportunity for release need not be provided through a parole board
process at all. Instead, states could consider a sentence modification mechanism
that would allow juvenile offenders to petition a court for resentencing and
release.359
Currently, in most state systems, there is no mechanism for the court to
reevaluate a sentence after a period of time.360 However, as discussed above, the
current draft of the Model Penal Code for sentencing recommends such a “second
look” procedure for adult and juvenile offenders.361 Under the MPC’s proposal, an
individual serving a prison sentence for a crime committed under the age of
eighteen would be able to petition a court for a sentence modification after serving
ten years in prison, and the judge could shorten the sentence at this later point in
time if the modified sentence would better serve the purposes of sentencing.362
A court-based sentence modification procedure could certainly provide a
meaningful opportunity for release within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.363 There are some advantages to a court-based approach. Judges

358. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78–79 (1992). An individual found not guilty
by reason of insanity is “entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer
dangerous.” Id. at 77 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, unlike inmates governed by a
discretionary parole regime, committed acquittees have an entitlement to release based on
certain criteria.
359. For more on judicial sentence modification, see generally Cecelia Klingele,
Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence Modification as a
Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465 (2010), and Margaret
Colgate Love & Cecelia Klingele, First Thoughts About “Second Look” and Other Sentence
Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Revision, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 859
(2011).
360. Steven Grossman & Stephen Shapiro, Judicial Modification of Sentences in
Maryland, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003); Klingele, supra note 359, at 498. In some
jurisdictions, sentence modification is possible but only with the government’s consent. See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-39(b) (West 2012) (requiring the consent of prosecutor
for modification of sentence longer than three years); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (resentencing
possible, upon government motion, based on prisoner’s substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another). Wisconsin and Maryland have sentence
modification procedures that do not rely on the prosecutor’s motion. In Wisconsin,
postsentencing rehabilitation is not a ground for sentence modification. See Klingele, supra
note 359, at 507. In Maryland, a sentence modification motion must be filed within ninety
days of sentencing, but judges can wait up to five years to act on the motions. Id. at 503.
361. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 6.11A(h), 305.6 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
2011).
362. Id. § 6.11A(h).
363. The MPC proposal leaves many procedural matters to the states, and thus adoption
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generally have no occasion to take a second look at sentences that they have
previously imposed, and they typically do not come face-to-face with someone who
is many years into a lengthy prison sentence.364 A second-look hearing before a
judge would expose the judge to a story of rehabilitation and could make the judge
more likely to believe that rehabilitation is possible in future cases. In addition, the
hearing may make the meaning of lengthy prison sentences more concrete to the
judge. Hence, the judge may be less inclined in future cases to impose a lifelong
sentence with no opportunity for review.
On the other hand, precisely because judges are not used to taking a second look
at sentences, they may be more reluctant to alter previously imposed sentences,
even in the face of compelling accounts of rehabilitation.365 Parole boards are used
to letting at least some people out of prison and view themselves as having
expertise in making judgments about who has been reformed and should be
released. Although parole boards may be risk adverse, they do actually release
some prisoners. Judges, on the other hand, are not used to making this sort of backend sentencing decision. Nevertheless, judges do make decisions about pretrial
release, and about whether to place someone in prison at all. They are thus called
upon to make decisions about whether an individual can be safely released into the
community. A “second look” sentencing assessment would not be entirely foreign
to a judge.
It appears that only three states currently have court-based second-look
procedures in place for juvenile offenders.366 In 1995, the Oregon legislature
enacted a second-look procedure.367 This reform followed legislation in 1994 that
created mandatory transfer laws and mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile
offenders. The second-look procedure applies to individuals who committed crimes
under the age of eighteen and were sentenced to more than twenty-four months
imprisonment following transfer to adult court.368 Under the procedure, the court
must hold a hearing when the juvenile offender has served half of the sentence.369
The Oregon statute lays out detailed requirements regarding the nature of the
second-look hearing. Notice of the hearing must be provided to relevant parties, the
hearing must be recorded and open to the public, and indigent prisoners have the

of the proposal would not automatically provide a meaningful hearing under the Eighth
Amendment. See id. §§ 6.11(A)(h), 305.6 cmt. In addition, Graham focuses on rehabilitation
in assessing release suitability, whereas under the MPC the judge considers whether a lesser
sentence would better serve the overall “purposes of sentencing.” Compare Graham v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029–30 (2010), with MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 305.6(4).
364. See Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress, and
Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 156–60 (2012).
365. Id. (discussing reluctance of courts to revisit sentences, even when there has been an
obvious error).
366. These states are Oregon, Delaware, and California.
367. JASON ZIEDENBERG, IMRAN AHMAD & SHANNON WRIGHT, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH
JUSTICE, MISGUIDED MEASURES: THE OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS OF MEASURE 11 ON OREGON’S
YOUTH 9–10 (2011), available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents
/Misguided_Measures_July_2011.pdf.
368. OR. REV. STAT. § 420A.203 (2011).
369. Id.
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right to appointed counsel. 370 The prisoner has a right to examine all reports and
documents submitted to the court and must be given access to records maintained
by the Oregon Youth Authority and Department of Corrections.371 At the hearing,
the prisoner “may examine all of the witnesses called by the state, may subpoena
and call witnesses to testify on the person’s behalf, and may present evidence and
argument.”372 In considering release, the court must consider various factors
regarding the prisoner’s background, offense, and efforts at rehabilitation.373 The
prisoner “has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that [he or
she] has been rehabilitated and reformed, and if conditionally released . . . , would
not be a threat to the safety of the victim, the victim’s family or the community . . .
and . . . would comply with the release conditions.”374 The court must make
specific findings regarding these matters.375 The prisoner or the state may appeal an
order entered under the statute.376
Thus, procedurally, the statute provides a structure for a hearing that gives
prisoners a meaningful opportunity to present a case for release. Other states can
look to this Oregon statute in creating similar court-based second-look procedures,
or in adopting procedures for their parole boards to use.
The second-look procedure for juvenile offenders recently enacted in Delaware
also permits prisoners to petition the court for resentencing, as does the new statute
in California. The Delaware statute specifies no criteria or procedures for the court

370.
371.
372.
373.

Id. § 420A.203(2)(c)–(d), (3)(b), (3)(h)–(i).
Id. § 420A.203(3)(e)–(f).
Id. § 420A.203(3)(g).
These factors are the following:
(A) The experiences and character of the person before and after commitment
to the Oregon Youth Authority or the Department of Corrections;
(B) The person’s juvenile and criminal records;
(C) The person’s mental, emotional and physical health;
(D) The gravity of the loss, damage or injury caused or attempted, during or as
part of the criminal act for which the person was convicted and sentenced;
(E) The manner in which the person committed the criminal act for which the
person was convicted and sentenced;
(F) The person’s efforts, participation and progress in rehabilitation programs
since the person’s conviction;
(G) The results of any mental health or substance abuse treatment;
(H) Whether the person demonstrates accountability and responsibility for past
and future conduct;
(I) Whether the person has made and will continue to make restitution to the
victim and the community;
(J) Whether the person will comply with and benefit from all conditions that
will be imposed if the person is conditionally released;
(K) The safety of the victim, the victim’s family and the community;
(L) The recommendations of the district attorney, the Oregon Youth Authority
and the Department of Corrections; and
(M) Any other relevant factors or circumstances raised by the state, the Oregon
Youth Authority, the Department of Corrections or the person.
Id. § 420A.203(4)(b).
374. Id. § 420A.203(3)(k).
375. See id. § 420A.203(4)(a).
376. Id. § 420A.203(6).
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to use in considering resentencing requests.377 In California, even if the judge grants a
resentencing request, the judge cannot actually release the prisoner. Rather, the court
can simply convert the LWOP sentence to a sentence of life with parole eligibility.378
Thus, California’s new parole release hearing procedures for juveniles must also be
considered to determine if the scheme complies with the Eighth Amendment.379
In sum, states amending their laws to comply with Graham and Miller should
ensure that legislation specifically addresses the procedures that will be used for
considering release for juvenile offenders. In establishing these procedures, states can
draw upon procedural models used at parole revocation and psychiatric review board
hearings. In addition, states can consider court-based models such as Oregon’s
second-look procedure.
CONCLUSION
After Graham and Miller, states are subject to a new constitutional requirement to
provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” for at least some categories of
juvenile offenders. This requirement encompasses three distinct components: (1) a
chance of release at a meaningful point in time, (2) a realistic likelihood of release for
the rehabilitated, and (3) a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
For the most part, states have responded to Graham and Miller by simply making
juvenile offenders eligible for parole under existing parole practices. Yet existing
parole systems were designed for a different purpose and have previously operated
free from constitutional constraints. In ordinary adult cases, states do not need to
provide prisoners with a realistic chance of release or a meaningful hearing. Indeed,
the survey data presented in this Article reveals parole practices in many states that
impede meaningful consideration of an inmate’s suitability for release. Some states
may not be able to rely on their existing parole board practices to provide a
meaningful opportunity for release as the Eighth Amendment requires and may need
to craft special rules for boards to use when considering release for juvenile offenders
serving lengthy sentences.
The scope of the Eighth Amendment’s meaningful opportunity requirement is
relevant not only in states that have imposed LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders
in nonhomicide cases or that mandate LWOP for homicide offenses. Rather, even
states that impose sentences of life with the possibility of parole on juvenile offenders
must also ensure that their parole processes in fact provide prisoners with a
meaningful opportunity for release. All states should examine whether their parole
systems are operating consistently with the new constitutional requirements.
Graham and Miller also provide an opportunity for states to rethink the manners in
which their parole boards treat adult offenders. If the legislature (and/or judge or jury)
has provided a prisoner with the chance for parole, then this chance should be
meaningful. Providing meaningful hearings for all parole-eligible prisoners will lead
to more accurate decisions and foster a sense of fairness and legitimacy about the
parole system.

377. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
SURVEY OF STATE PAROLE PRACTICES
Table 1. Direct contact with prisoner

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

How conducted?

Interview or
hearing with
inmate in at least
some cases?

Called interview
(I) or hearing
(H)?

In person (P);
video (V);
telephone (T)

Conducted
exclusively by
releasing authority
member/s?

N
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

n/a
H
X
H
H
H
Both
H
I
I
H
Both
H
X
I
H
H
H
X
H
Both
I
H
X
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
n/a
H
H
X
H
I
H
H
H
H
I
H
H
I
H
I
I
Both

n/a
P, T
X
P, V
P
V, T
P, V, T
P
P
P
P, V
P, V, T
P
X
V
P, V, T
P, V
V
X
P, V
P
V
V
X
P, T
P, T
P
P, V
P, V
P, V
P, V
V
n/a
P, V, T
V
X
P, V, T
P, V
P, V, T
V
P, V
P, V
P
P, V
P, V, T
P, V, T
P, V
P, V
P, V, T
P

n/a
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
Y
N
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
N
N
Y
Y
X
N
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
n/a
Y
Y
X
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
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Table 2. Input from attorney for prisoner

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Attorney input
considered?

In-person input
from attorney?

Attorney present
at inmate
interview or
hearing?

Y
Y
X
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
N
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
N
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
X
Y
Y
n/a
n/a
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
n/a
Y
N
Y
X
Y
Y
n/a
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
X
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
n/a
Y
Y
Y
N
Y

n/a
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
N
Y
X
N
Depends
N
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
n/a
Y
N
X
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y

Appointment of
counsel (in any
cases)?
N
N
X
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
X
N
N
N
N
X
N
Y
N
N
X
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
X
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
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Table 3. Other input from attorney for prisoner

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Can attorney present
mental health expert
testimony?

Can attorney present
other witness testimony
or statements?

Can attorney present
written mental health
report?

Y
Y
X
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
X
N
Y
N
Y
X
N
Depends
N
N
X
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
X
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y

Y
—
X
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
X
N
Y
N
Y
X
N
Depends
N
N
X
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
X
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y

Y
Y
X
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
N
Y
N
Y
X
Y
Y
N
N
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
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Table 4. Input from prosecutor

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Input from prosecutor
considered?

In-person
input from
prosecutor?

Prosecution witness
testimony/statement permitted?

Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
X
N
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
N
N
X
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
X
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
N
n/a

Y
N
X
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
X
N
N
N
Y
X
N
Depends
N
N
X
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
X
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
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Table 5. Input from victim

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Input from victim considered?

In-person input from victim?

Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
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Table 6. Input from other sources

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Written case
history/summaries
compiled?

Does parole
board or DOC
employee
compile
summary?

Input from
others who
know
inmate?

In-person
input from
others who
know inmate?

Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Depends
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Board
DOC
X
DOC
DOC
DOC
Board
Both
Both
Board
DOC
Board
Both
X
DOC
Board
DOC
DOC
X
Board
Both
DOC
DOC
X
Both
Both
Both
DOC
DOC
Board
n/a
DOC
Board
DOC
Both
X
Both
Board
DOC
Board
DOC
Both
Board
DOC
DOC
Both
Board
DOC
DOC
DOC

Y
N
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
n/a
X
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
X
N
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
Depends
Y
N
X
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
X
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
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Table 7. Prisoner access to information

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Access to prosecutor
input?

Access to victim input?

Access to mental
health evaluation?
(where conducted by
parole board)

N
Y
X
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Limited
N
Y
N
Limited
X
N
N
Limited
N
X
Limited
Y
Y
Limited
X
Y
Y
N
Limited
Y
Limited
N
N
N
Limited
Limited
X
Y
N
With consent
Y
Y
Limited
N
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Limited
n/a

N
Y
X
Limited
—
N
Y
N
Limited
N
Y
N
N
X
N
N
Limited
N
X
N
Some cases
N
With consent
X
N
—
N
With consent
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
X
Y
N
With consent
Limited
Limited
N
N
Y
Limited
N
Limited
Limited
N
N

n/a
n/a
X
n/a
Y
n/a
Y
N
n/a
N
Y
n/a
n/a
X
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
X
N
n/a
Y
Y
X
n/a
N
n/a
n/a
n/a
N
n/a
N
N
n/a
N
X
Y
N
N
N
n/a
N
n/a
Y
Y
n/a
Y
n/a
—
Y

